ARGUMENT: QUANTUM TECHNOLOGYTo Restrict, or Not to Restrict, That Is the Quantum Question
Innovation power—the ability to invent, scale, and adapt emerging technologies—will determine which country prevails in the great power competition of the 21st century. Export controls thus assume a central position in the U.S. foreign policy toolkit, carrying the ability to significantly impact an adversary’s innovation potential. “U.S. policymakers are right to identify quantum information science as a critical technology area ripe for restriction, but introducing export controls now is likely to cause more harm than good.,” Sam Howell writes.
Innovation power—the ability to invent, scale, and adapt emerging technologies—will determinewhich country prevails in the great power competition of the 21st century. Export controls thus assume a central position in the U.S. foreign policy toolkit, carrying the ability to significantly impact an adversary’s innovation potential.
Sam Howell writes in Lawfare that in October 2022, the Biden administration introduced semiconductor, artificial intelligence, and supercomputing-related export controlson China and has since hintedthat similar restrictions on other technologies, including quantum information science, may soon follow.
He adds:
U.S. policymakers are right to identifyquantum information science as a critical technology area ripe for restriction, but introducing export controls now is likely to cause more harm than good.
Establishing U.S. leadershipin quantum information science, which includes the subfields of quantum computing, quantum sensing, and quantum communications, ranks among the Biden administration’s highest national security priorities. Quantum technologies promise to dramatically increase computing power and speed, enabling machines to solve problems beyond the capacity of current-generation computers. They are also inherently dual use, meaning they can be applied to both military and civilian contexts.
The potential strategic advantages of quantum technologies are numerous and significant. Quantum-enabled countries could crackan adversary’s encryption methods, build unbreakablecommunications networks, and develop the world’s most precise sensors. The first country to operationalize quantum technologies will gain the ability to threaten adversaries’ corporate, military, and government infrastructure more quickly than an adversary can establish effective defenses. Beyond the direct military applications, quantum technologies could further deliversignificant economic advantages in a range of industries, from aerospace and defense to pharmaceuticals and automotive.
Given its strategic importance, quantum technology has become a focal point in the ongoing competition between Beijing and Washington. “In line with the ‘protect’ pillar of the Biden administration’s two-pronged technology strategy, U.S. policymakers have already implemented a number of narrowly scoped export controls on quantum technology in an effort to safeguard critical U.S. technological advances,” Howell writes.
While existing controls on quantum technology are relatively haphazard and disconnected, the White House is currently exploringa more unified and comprehensive round of controls intended specifically to blunt China’s access to U.S. quantum computing equipment. When asked at a public eventin October 2022 whether the Biden administration would subject quantum technology to additional export controls, Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Alan F. Estevez stated, “If I were a betting person, I’d put down money on that.”
Forthcoming regulations on quantum technology could be structured in a variety of ways.: U.S. policymakers could choose to expand existing controls targeting explicit end users and use cases, or they could opt for novel controls focused on quantum technology itself. Among the options:
· Restrict the flow of quantum technologies to a broader base of end users, such as China’s national laboratories, companies within the Chinese military’s supply chain, or companies accused of human rights abuses.
· Prevent adversaries’ application of quantum technologies to certain use cases, resembling existing controls on defense-relevant quantum sensors.
· Target quantum technology itself. Policymakers could restrict entire integrated quantum systems, like functional quantum computers or quantum communications satellites, and the components required to build them.
· Regulate specific quantum hardware and components.
Howell concludes:
U.S. government analysts working on quantum information science should develop metrics to assess the utility of export controls as the technology develops. The emergence of joint ventures between U.S. and Chinese state-linked quantum startups, for instance, might elevate the risks associated with open and collaborative research processes to an unacceptable level, introducing the need for greater oversight and regulation. Policymakers may also consider implementing export controls on quantum technologies once the U.S. secures a definitive lead over foreign competitors. Other useful metrics might illuminate China’s efforts to commercialize quantum technologies, control the quantum market, or integrate quantum technologies into its national defense infrastructure.
Export controls are an increasingly useful tool to prevent adversaries’ acquisition of sensitive technology and advance U.S. security and economic interests. But they are not a silver bullet solution to U.S.-China technology competition and can even be counterproductive. Premature export controls could impede innovation and handicap U.S. companies. Export controls on quantum technologies may be necessary in the future but should serve as one component of a broader U.S. technology strategy, rather than an end in and of themselves.
