IRAQ WARA Careful Rethinking of the Iraq War
A new book details military operations and political dynamics in Iraq, shedding new light on the challenges of state-building. “The United States wanted to build a new Iraqi state, but what we did was create a situation where multiple and large Shia militia make deals with each other,” says the author, Roger Petersen.
The term “fog of war” expresses the chaos and uncertainty of the battlefield. Often, it is only in hindsight that people can grasp what was unfolding around them.
Now, additional clarity about the Iraq War has arrived in the form of a new book by MIT political scientist Roger Petersen, which dives into the war’s battlefield operations, political dynamics, and long-term impact. The U.S. launched the Iraq War in 2003 and formally wrapped it up in 2011, but Petersen analyzes the situation in Iraq through the current day and considers what the future holds for the country.
After a decade of research, Petersen identifies four key factors for understanding Iraq’s situation. First, the U.S. invasion created chaos and a lack of clarity in terms of the hierarchy among Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish groups. Second, given these conditions, organizations that comprised a mix of militias, political groups, and religious groups came to the fore and captured elements of the new state the U.S. was attempting to set up. Third, by about 2018, the Shia groups became dominant, establishing a hierarchy, and along with that dominance, sectarian violence has fallen. Finally, the hybrid organizations established many years ago are now highly integrated into the Iraqi state.
Petersen has also come to believe two things about the Iraq War are not fully appreciated. One is how widely U.S. strategy varied over time in response to shifting circumstances.
“This was not one war,” says Petersen. “This was many different wars going on. We had at least five strategies on the U.S. side.”
And while the expressed goal of many U.S. officials was to build a functioning democracy in Iraq, the intense factionalism of Iraqi society led to further military struggles, between and among religious and ethnic groups. Thus, U.S. military strategy shifted as this multisided conflict evolved.
“What really happened in Iraq, and the thing the United States and Westerners did not understand at first, is how much this would become a struggle for dominance among Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds,” says Petersen. “The United States thought they would build a state, and the state would push down and penetrate society. But it was society that created militias and captured the state.”
