Could a U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal Spark Middle East Arms Race?
“I fear that Saudi Arabia — a nation with a terrible human rights record — cannot be trusted to use its civil nuclear energy program solely for peaceful purposes and will instead enrich uranium and seek to develop nuclear weapons,” argued Markey, co-chair of his government’s nuclear weapons and arms control working group.
Besides fears that the Saudis might end up with nuclear bombs, there are also concerns that simply permitting them to enrich uranium would set off a regional race.
“Allowing Saudi Arabia to acquire such capabilities could set a problematic precedent at the international level. It could possibly encourage other countries in the region, such as Egypt or Turkey, to pursue similar nuclear capabilities, leading to a proliferation cascade in an already volatile Middle East,” Manuel Herrera, a researcher focused on nuclear non-proliferation at Istituto Affari Internazionali, an Italian thinktank, wrote late last year.
Herrera and other experts hope that if a Saudi civilian nuclear program happens, the US government will enforce strict guardrails. These might include deferring uranium enrichment inside Saudi Arabia until later or setting up an enrichment facility that only American citizens can access. It could also include allowing a Saudi-based conversion plant to turn refined uranium powder into gas, but not enriching uranium.
The Saudis could also be asked to adhere to conditions, including signing on to specific non-proliferation criteria under Section 123 of the US 1954 Atomic Energy Act and agreeing to additional inspections by the Austria-based International Atomic Energy Agency.
“As far as we know, the US is trying to put forward a deal very similar to the one that they did with the United Arab Emirates in 2009, in which they applied Section 123,” Herrera explained to DW in an interview earlier this week. However, the Saudis have previously said no to that.
What Does Israel Have to Do with It Now?
“The assumption has been that the various elements [of a US-Saudi agreement] would be mutually reinforcing,” Robert Einhorn, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Brookings Institute, wrote in an April briefing.
“For example, normalization would make nuclear cooperation with [Saudi Arabia] more palatable to Israel, and a US security guarantee and nuclear cooperation would make normalization more palatable to [Saudi Arabia].”
But now that Israel is not involved, analysts say the “mega deal” may be another way to pressure the Israeli government. Israel’s allies, including the US, have been pushing Israeli leaders towards a different, more careful approach in Gaza. The Israeli government has previously said it doesn’t want the Saudis to get any kind of uranium enrichment capacities.
Cathrin Schaer is a freelance journalist based in Berlin. This article is published courtesy of Deutsche Welle (DW).