INTELLIGENCE FAILURESThe October 7 Attack: An Assessment of the Intelligence Failings
Hours after the Hamas attack of October 7 began, they were widely attributed to an apparent Israeli intelligence failure, with pundits pointing to several possible sources, including a misunderstanding of Hamas’ intentions, cognitive biases, and an overreliance on the country’s technological superiority. Building on previous literature on surprise attacks and intelligence failures to examine both Israel’s political level and intelligence level prior to October 7, 2023, the findings suggest that the attack was likely not the result of a single glaring failure but rather the accumulation of several problems at both levels.
A year after Hamas’ onslaught in Southern Israel, which resulted in the deaths of at least 1,195 civilians and security personnel and the abduction of an additional 251, tensions across the region remain high.1 In Gaza, the Israeli Defense Forces continue military operations amidst a large and continuing death toll and extensive damage to infrastructure. The Israeli government’s initial stated aims were to degrade the military capabilities of Hamas and associated terrorist groups, secure the release of Israeli hostages, and remove the Islamist movement from power.2 But the conflict Israel is engaged in is much wider than Gaza now. A year on from October 7, Israel is waging an intense military campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon, engaged in a confrontation across the region with the various nodes of the “Axis of Resistance,” including the Houthis and pro-Tehran Iraqi militias, and—in the wake of the October 1 ballistic missile strikes on its territory—is on the brink of direct war with Iran.
At the time of publication, many aspects of the October 7 attack remain uncertain, murky, and contested. Some analysts, the U.S. intelligence community, and reportedly even Hamas leaders themselves have noted the group’s surprise at the ease with which its operatives breached the barrier separating the Gaza Strip from Israel, as well as the slowness of the Israeli response.3 A number of articles have invoked the notion of a “catastrophic success”a that, while briefly overwhelming Israeli security forces, would lead to devastation among the Palestinian population of Gaza.4 Other pundits have argued that Hamas meticulously planned its operation with the primary objective of “[goading] the Israelis into Gaza for a prolonged confrontation.”5 Some media reports even suggest that the attackers had prepared to penetrate even deeper into Israeli territory, carrying supplies for several days to push as far as the West Bank, with the intent of attacking larger Israeli cities along the way.6
Finally, an assessment by the Royal United Services Institute states that “Hamas fighters deviated significantly from their own plan during its execution […as the] original planning documents showed that Hamas had intended to fortify the positions it had seized and use hostages to complicate the IDF’s retaking of these positions.” However, the chaotic massacre, carried out in large part by some 1,000 Gazans who followed the Hamas strike force through the barrier, “diverted efforts to prepare for a deliberate defense.”7
