TERRORISMEmerging Tech and Terrorism: Adoption Patterns and Implications
The diffusion of innovation theory highlights that most organizations, groups, and individuals adopt innovations in the mid-to-late product lifecycle. This applies to technology adoption by terror groups: most violent non-state actors will adopt technology once it has crossed several thresholds, including cost, availability, testing (i.e., proof of concept), and ease of use.
Three men were recently charged with a planned attack on an Islamic education centre in Leeds, UK. Obtained from the scene were a 3D printer, instructions on additive manufacturing firearms, a 3D printed FGC-9 semi-automatic firearm, and Nazi memorabilia. According to officials, the plan included the education center and other “human targets.”
A Growing Threat: Terrorist Use of Emerging Technologies
Defined as technology that is currently being developed or expected in the next 5-10 years that will have a significant impact on society, industry, or the broader economy, emerging technology is a core focus of the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center (NCITE). Alluded to above, many violent non-state actors have embraced the use of emerging technology to increasingly violent ends.
NCITE has developed projects on the use of AI by terrorist groups, the emerging threat landscape as viewed through a mixed reality lens, and the role of geospatial technologies in threatening critical infrastructure and soft targets, among others. To understand “over-the-horizon” threats requires consideration of how technology is linked to those threats. Central to that is whether terrorists are framed as adopters, or drivers, of emerging technology.
Terrorists as Adopters of Innovation: Fewer Lead, Most Follow
The diffusion of innovation theory highlights that most organizations, groups, and individuals adopt innovations in the mid-to-late product lifecycle. Consumers in the mainstream market are late adopters, comprising approximately 85% of that space.
Indeed, a central thesis of the seminal work by Cronin (2019) on technology adoption by terror groups is that most violent non-state actors will adopt technology once it has crossed several thresholds, including cost, availability, testing (i.e., proof of concept), and ease of use.
Examples of this mid-to-late adoption of emerging technology are abundant. Consider, for example, that militant groups have used commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (i.e., drones) to deliver explosives against hard and soft targets for more than 10 years. Within the foreign terrorist landscape, the Houthi forces and the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham were early pioneers of this method. This tactic can no longer be described as novel. However, as the threat remains unresolved, and the technology has become even more widely accessible, it continues to offer extremists the opportunity to create outsized harm.
