Shia Militarism Upstages Salafi Jihadism in West Asia

But perhaps Salafi jihadists are themselves to blame for their present predicament. Al-Qaeda and the ISIS always opposed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and even Hamas for fighting a nationalist Palestinian cause,7 rather than opposing the Westphalian and democratic nation-state system of the so-called ‘taghut’.8 By resorting to indiscriminate violence against civilians (particularly women and children), targeting the existing international political and economic order, by alienating all Western and Eastern countries (even Hanafi Sunni nations and groups like Turkey, Taliban and Hamas), Salafi jihadists are today seen in West Asia as strategically demented doomsday cultists, perpetually baying for blood.9

On the other hand, Iran has projected itself as a pan-Islamist power, and not just a Shia theocracy. By following this strategy, it has managed to extend its influence up to the Mediterranean, and has successfully brought the Lebanon, Syria and Iraq under its hegemonic sway. Unlike unruly Salafi jihadist groups that often turn on their own patrons, Iran has exercised effective command and control over its regional proxies, equipping them with latest know-how in warfare and weaponry as well as the use of sharp power to infiltrate and attack opponents. It has made them competent militias in their own right, fighting regional wars with greater strategic acumen and self-reliance. In fact, the inability of Salafi-jihadists to establish an enduring Islamic State has denied them the ability to promote proxies around the world and is the main cause of their failures.

In comparison to Salafi jihadists and Israel, Iran has also proven to be more adept at running successful media and public relations campaigns that has been able to extinguish the flames of vengeance from its Sunni rivals in the Levant and by targeting mainly military sites in its attacks that has presented it as a more responsible military force to the world thus far. The impact of Iran’s mostly precise intermediate range ballistic missiles and drone attacks—making unprecedented forays into Israeli airspace, undermining its much-vaunted air defense systems and its supposed and still unverified nuclear status—seem to have captured the fancy of demoralized Arab masses, who are blaming Israel and not Iran for the plight of Palestinians, at least for now.

Meanwhile, the theocratic state has also promoted its image as a champion of the developing world, voice of the Global South and supporter of humanitarian causes,10 even though it has conveniently ignored the plight of Uyghur Muslims to please the Chinese government and allegedly oppresses minorities and women within its borders. By focusing solely on the so-called ‘Far Enemy’—the West and Israel—Iran has successfully exploited the anti-liberal political discourse presently popular around the world and has upstaged the myopic Near Enemy outlook of Salafi jihadist groups like ISIS by calling them ‘takfiri’ (Muslims who commit the big sin of accusing fellow Muslims ‘kafir’).11

It is noteworthy that Shia theology like traditional Judaism practiced political quietism for centuries as the community patiently awaits the manifestation of its promised savior (the Divinely Guided Mahdi).12 Again like Zionism, Shia thinkers and clergy started advocating militant activism only in modern times, as Red Shiism of Shariati culminated into the Khomeini-led Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979.

According to Shia tradition, only the most senior theologians (mujtahids), have the authority to declare a ‘defensive’ jihad, while only the 12th or ‘hidden’ Imam—who the Shia believe is still alive after disappearing 1,100 years ago—will declare an ‘offensive’ jihad on his return.13 Although most orthodox Sunni jurists also advocate defensive jihad, modern-day jihadists like Qutb, Faraj and Zawahiri ridicule the difference between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ warfare,14 with ISIS being particularly notorious in killing the so-called Shia ‘Rafida’ (Rejectors of the First Three Pious Caliphs).15

The moot question here is how long Iran and its three main proxies—Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthis—sustain their ongoing campaign in West Asia? Can the Islamic Republic of Iran depend on Russian and Chinese support for a favorable resolution of the present conflict? Will the highly demoralized and weakened Arab states, that continue to suffer from the so-called Stockholm syndrome, switching loyalties from one regional hegemon to the other—championing the slogans of Abraham Accords and non-sectarian pan-Islamism in the same breath—ever hold their own? However, even in the current context of the beleaguered Arab states, continuing internecine sectarian feud and ever-escalating regional conflicts, the declining Salafi-jihadist threat can be discounted only at one’s own peril.

Adil Rasheed is Research Fellow (SS) at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. This article was originally published by Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.