ARGUMENT: CHINA & COUNTERTERRORISMChina’s Counterterrorism Ambitions in Africa

Africa is now the epicenter of global terrorism due to al-Qaeda and Islamic State militant violence. Jason Warner writes in Lawfarethatfor counterterrorism assistance, African states, over the past decade, have turned to the United States, more recently to Russia— once upon a time they turned to France . Historically, China has had a negligible role in counterterrorism in Africa. Its primary role on the continent has been as an economic partner. “However, China has begun quietly making inroads to become a much more significant counterterrorism partner with African states, promising potential partners increased cooperation under the auspices of its Global Security Initiative (GSI),” Warner writers, adding:

China’s contemporary and expanded push in African counterterrorism has come under the banner of the GSI, which it introduced in 2022 as a new, alternative framework to the current Western-led security order. In line with China’s broader national security ethos of combating the “three evils”—ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism—the GSI’s vision of global security emphasizes territorial sovereignty and non-interference, and it has a clear focus on counterterrorism. In its initial rollout, the GSI’s counterterrorism focus was especially evident for the regions of Southeast Asia and Central Asia, but the framework mentioned little about counterterrorism in Africa.

However, in a 2023 GSI concept paper, China pledged to “[s]upport the efforts of African countries … [to] fight terrorism … and to provide financial and technical support to Africa-led counter-terrorism operations.” This statement indicated special attention; though the paper covered global topics, Africa was the only region treated with a discussion of counterterrorism. This was followed by a March 2023 UN speech by Liu Yuxi, special representative of the Chinese government on African affairs at the United Nations, focused exclusively on the need for more global action to combat terrorism in Africa. In the speech, Liu argued that the antidote to the rise of terrorism was economic development, which China could offer via the Belt and Road Initiative.

More recently, China’s push to move from being primarily an economic partner to a more security-focused partner was evident at the September 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which U.S Institute of Peace China expert Carla Freeman argues “saw an unprecedented Chinese emphasis on its role in security on the continent.” In the opening speech of the summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping promised to provide Africa with approximately $140 million in grants for military assistance; training for 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 police and law enforcement officers; participation in joint military exercises, training, and patrols; and invitations for 500 young African military officers to visit China. In his remarks, though, Xi did not state an explicit interest in counterterrorism, suggesting that he did not want to frame the engagement through the lens of counterterrorism assistance because of the perceived inefficiencies of French, U.S., and Russian counterterrorism assistance that have made it a potentially polarizing issue in Africa.

Beijing’s interests also have been marked by other evident, though quiet, steps since the rollout of the GSI. These included China’s hosting of the first and second Horn of Africa Peace Conferences in 2022 and 2024 and a joint counterterrorism military exercise with Mozambique and Tanzania in August 2024. In line with its broader ethos, China’s increasing forays into African counterterrorism have been calculated, quiet, and generally risk averse.

Warner writes that the good news is that the ways that China is seeking to insert itself into the African counterterrorism landscape, thus far, raise no major red flags, although points of friction might emerge.

Warner concludes that

on a grander geopolitical scale, the GSI and the counterterrorism ambitions that China has embedded within it are inherently in opposition to the U.S.-led global security order. China’s absorption of African states into its security orbit through the conduit of counterterrorism cooperation will not be welcomed by the United States.

China’s efforts to gain influence via counterterrorism in Africa are clear, quiet, and pragmatic. While the red lights are not yet blinking in Washington regarding Beijing’s efforts, they certainly should not be overlooked.