BIOLOGICAL WEAPONSForging the Biological Weapon Convention: A Brief History of the Creation of the BWC

Published 29 March 2025

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) stands as a monument to international ambition: the first multilateral treaty to comprehensively ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The treaty’s origins are deeply rooted in the horrors of 20th-century warfare, advancements in biotechnology, and the geopolitical tensions of the Cold War.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) stands as a monument to international ambition: the first multilateral treaty to comprehensively ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The treaty’s origins are deeply rooted in the horrors of 20th-century warfare, advancements in biotechnology, and the geopolitical tensions of the Cold War.

March 26, 2025 marks the 50th anniversary of the convention entering into force. This is the optimum time to re-examine the BWC’s history, the forces that shaped it, and the persistent challenges that undermine its effectiveness. The goal of this article is not to serve just as a historical exercise, but as a vital examination of our present vulnerabilities to biological threats and the future of global biosecurity.

From Early Bioweapons to the Geneva Protocol
The use of biological agents in warfare is an ancient practice. Armies of the past contaminated water supplies with animal carcasses, and medieval sieges involved hurling plague-infested corpses into besieged cities. However, the industrialization of warfare in the 20th century transformed biological weapons (BW) into tools of mass destruction, capable of inflicting devastation on an unprecedented scale. 

The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of chemical and biological weapons in war. This prohibition reflected global revulsion at the chemical atrocities of World War I. It also reflected allegations of Germany’s use of anthrax and glanders against Allied livestock during that conflict. However, the Protocol deliberately did not ban the development, production, or stockpiling of BW. This limitation was a significant flaw that allowed nations to continue pursuing biological weapons programs. 

Japan, even after signing the Protocol, established Unit 731 in Manchuria by 1932 and weaponized Bacillus anthracis and Yersinia pestis, among other pathogens, under the guise of public health research. The Soviet Union initiated tularemia studies at military microbiological institutes

World War II further eroded the Geneva Protocol’s credibility, driven by two key developments:

·  Industrial-scale Production: Japan’s Pingfan facility claimed it could produce 300 kg of Y. pestis in one cycle

·  Aerosolization Breakthrough: U.S. experiments in the 1-million-liter “eight ball” chamber at Camp Detrick optimized pathogen dispersal as aerosol clouds.

The Cold War Catalyst
The post-World War II era was marked by rapid progress in biotechnology, fueled by research into vaccines, antibiotics, and genetic engineering. These advancements, paradoxically, also enhanced offensive BW capabilities. For example, the U.S. developed anti-crop agents and optimized Bacillus anthracis for aerial dispersal during its offensive program from 1943 to 1969.