DRONES & TERRORISMMoving Targets: Implications of the Russo-Ukrainian War for Drone Terrorism
Small and commercially available drones in the hands of violent extremists pose a rapidly growing terrorist threat. This threat hasimplications for global counterterrorism, especially when considering the psychological impact, scalability, and low operational risk of drone attacks.
Abstract: Small and commercially available drones in the hands of violent extremists pose a rapidly growing terrorist threat. This article examines that threat in the light of the invasion of Ukraine. Consumer drones such as DJI Mavics, FPV racing drones, and Shahed-style one-way attack drones have become potent weapons. Their affordability, accessibility, and adaptability enable precision strikes, bypass traditional defenses, and democratize air power for state and non-state actors alike. This article details how these drones have been used in Ukraine—from grenade-dropping quadcopters to long-range strategic attacks—and highlights their potential adoption by violent extremist organizations (VEOs). The second part of the article assesses the implications for global counterterrorism, emphasizing the psychological impact, scalability, and low operational risk of drone attacks. It concludes by outlining countermeasures, including electronic jamming, physical barriers, kinetic interception, and the growing role of drone-on-drone defense, urging a comprehensive and adaptive response to this multifaceted and accelerating threat.
A trailer towed by a truck pops off a false roof, releasing dozens of miniature kamikaze drones that wreak havoc on a nearby military airbase. Dozens of aircraft are severely damaged or destroyed, amounting to billions of dollars in losses. This scenario used to be the stuff of Hollywood action movies but has now played out in real life, specifically in Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb against Russia at the beginning of June 2025.1 More importantly, the underlying capability is based on commercial, commodity hardware and software that is available to everyone. Any actor can acquire and fly drones, carry out precision strikes from a significant range, and bypass legacy defensive measures. This reality has significant implications for terrorism.
Small drones first entered the terrorism discussion in 2014.2 In Iraq, the Islamic State utilized a number of different drone types, including consumer quadcopters3 and Skywalker X-8 hobbyist fixed wing drones carrying explosives.4 These caused alarm and delayed operations, but inflicted little serious damage and were largely countered by U.S. jamming.
