Forging the Biological Weapon Convention: A Brief History of the Creation of the BWC
The Soviet Union clandestinely weaponized B. anthracis, Y. pestis, and smallpox virus, masking its activities under the guise of civilian research.
By the 1960s, advances in microbiology, such as lyophilization (freeze-drying) of pathogens and aerosolization techniques, led to the development of more stable and deployable BW, raising concerns that existing laws were insufficient. The dual-use nature of these technologies, having both peaceful and military applications, complicated efforts to distinguish legitimate scientific research from weapons development.
A pivotal shift occurred in 1969 when the U.S. unilaterally renounced bioweapons. President Richard Nixon, citing BW’s “massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences” as incompatible with U.S. interests, ordered the destruction of existing stockpiles. This move, partly influenced by the success of nuclear deterrence and the impracticality of BW for strategic goals, created diplomatic space for multilateral negotiations. Initially hesitant due to suspicions of U.S. biodefense programs, the Soviet Union, as part of its strategy to engage diplomatically, gradually supported a ban, despite not intending to comply with it.
Negotiating the BWC: Drafting a “General Purpose” Treaty
In July 1969, the UK submitted a draft convention to the UN General Assembly, proposing a total ban on BW development and production. This proposal emphasized the existential risk of BW proliferation and the need for a “general purpose” treaty, distinct from the limited scope of the Geneva Protocol. The proposal gained traction through the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD), a multilateral forum that included the United States and the Soviet Union, where non-aligned states advocated for stringent verification measures. However, these demands were ultimately deferred due to Cold War tensions.
Article I of the BWC enshrines its core obligation: never under any circumstances to “develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain” microbial or toxin agents for hostile purposes. While this broad language aimed to encompass emerging technologies, the BWC treaty omitted formal verification mechanisms, relying instead on Article V’s formal consultative process and Article VI’s opaque process for lodging complaints via the UN Security Council. The Soviet Union initially opposed separating chemical and biological weapons into distinct treaties and sought a single convention covering both. However, it eventually accepted a standalone Biological Weapons Convention that classified toxins under the broader “biological” umbrella. Meanwhile, the United States resisted constraints that could limit its biodefense activities..
Why did initial calls for BWC verification fail?
The inclusion of verification measures in the BWC was a point of contention from the beginning. Despite calls for verification, the Cold War rivalry prevented the inclusion of any intrusive inspection mechanism. The U.S. and USSR harbored deep suspicions that the other was secretly continuing BW programs under the guise of defensive research. The Soviets feared U.S. intelligence operations disguised as inspections, while the U.S. was concerned that a clandestine Soviet BW program would evade detection.
Entry into Force and Early Challenges
The BWC entered into force on March 26, 1975, following ratification by 22 states, including its three depositary governments (the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States). By 2023, 188 nations had joined the Convention, though key holdouts (such as Egypt, Israel, and Syria) highlight ongoing geopolitical divides. Early adherence was bolstered by the treaty’s perceived symbolic value, but implementation lagged, with few states enacting robust national legislation to criminalize BW activities and the confidence-building measures (CBMs) suffered from inconsistent reporting.
In 1979, an anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) exposed the USSR’s clandestine BW program. Soviet authorities attributed the deaths to tainted meat, but U.S. intelligence linked the outbreak to an accidental release from a military facility. This was later confirmed after the Soviet Union’s collapse. The incident reinforced concerns about compliance and the lack of verification tools. Information from Soviet and Russian defectors revealed the extent of Soviet breaches of the treaty, such as the weaponization of smallpox and Marburg viruses by the Biopreparat network (1973-1992) at facilities nominally dedicated to vaccine development. Subsequent revelations about Iraq’s BW program in the 1990s—including the weaponization of Bacillus anthracis, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxins—further eroded confidence and prompted renewed calls for compliance measures.
The BWC in the 21st Century: Adapting to New Threats
The BWC faces a complex landscape in the 21st century. Rapid advancements in synthetic biology, CRISPR gene editing, and gain-of-function research have dramatically increased the dual-use risks. The proliferation of high-containment labs ( 51 BSL-4 facilities in operation worldwide) has made comprehensive monitoring more challenging.
The COVID-19 pandemic served as a brutal reminder of the devastating potential of both natural and potentially engineered pathogens. The pandemic has revitalized discussions around the BWC’s Article X, which focuses on peaceful international cooperation. Initiatives like the WHO’s BioHub Facility and the Global Partnership Against WMD’s biosecurity projects aim to better integrate the BWC with the global health framework.
However, the BWC has also made significant progress since its inception. Since the Ninth Review Conference in 2022, BWC implementation has shown meaningful progress. More countries have enacted national legislation criminalizing biological weapons activities, supported by initiatives like the Global Partnership’s legal workshops and the launch of BWCImplementation.org, which tracks national measures. CBM participation also reached record highs in 2022 and 2023, with over half of States Parties submitting reports—an important step toward greater transparency in the absence of formal verification. These developments reflect growing global commitment to strengthening the BWC and closing long-standing implementation gaps.
Some old tensions remain. Developed nations, wary of dual-use risks, push for stronger verification and biosafety standards. Developing countries emphasize the need for equitable access to biotechnology for public health and economic development. This divide continues to hinder the BWC’s ability to effectively address both global biosecurity and scientific collaboration.
The old debates about verification have resurfaced, but progress remains elusive. In the 1990s, efforts to introduce more stringent monitoring were blocked, culminating in the U.S. rejection of a 2001 verification protocol. While the Ninth BWC Review Conference in 2022 rekindled discussions through the creation of a new Working Group, a consensus is still out of reach.
Conclusion: The BWC’s Legacy and Unfinished Agenda
The BWC stands at a critical juncture. Born from a moment of moral clarity and scientific foresight, it represents an attempt to build a shield against one of humanity’s darkest impulses. But its inherent flaws – the lack of verification and the reliance on trust – have left it vulnerable.
As biotechnology empowers more actors and makes the engineering of biological agents easier, the BWC must adapt or risk becoming obsolete. Enhanced transparency, equitable cooperation, and innovative monitoring tools are essential if the Convention is to remain relevant in an age of unprecedented biological risks. The ongoing work of the 2023-2026 Working Group offers a chance to rewrite the narrative, and to ensure that the future is not defined by the weaponization of life itself.
Further reading:
2. Biological warfare and bioterrorism: a historical review
3. Biological warfare. A historical perspective
4. Living Weapons by Gregory D Koblentz
Neha Suresh is a molecular biologist, biosecurity researcher, and science communicator. This article is published courtesy of the Pandora Report.
