IRAN’S NUKESNegotiating a New Iran Nuclear Deal

By The Institute for Science and International Security

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Finalized 12 August 2019, published 24 March 2025

The Institute for Science and International Security produced this study in 2019 at the request of the administration for an internal discussion on sketching out its position. It is not the current administration’s or the Institute’s position, although the Institute supports the general thrust, especially the need to go beyond JCPOA limits and for Iran to provide the IAEA a verified complete nuclear declaration. The Institute has not updated the study since then, but it believes that it is useful today in a public discussion.

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The United States should seek a new or modified nuclear agreement with Iran that verifiably denies it all routes to producing or acquiring a nuclear weapon, or otherwise maintaining nuclear weapons capabilities. This includes ensuring that Iran does not have pathways to nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future and that its nuclear programs are verifiably peaceful. Inherent to that determination is a finding prior to, or early on, in the implementation of any new or modified deal that there is a high level of confidence in the absence of undeclared Iranian nuclear materials and facilities. Under no circumstances should the United States diminish or abandon the campaign of maximum economic pressure against Iran until its conditions are met.

A new approach is needed to deal with the Iran nuclear issue in light of the sustained, threatening nature of Iran’s advanced nuclear capabilities to international peace and security, as well as the proliferation risk they continue to pose for the Middle East region. This threat has not been eliminated by the time-bound nuclear limitations and, in effect, partial inspection procedures implemented under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and associated United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231. The United States should build a new nuclear agreement, or failing that, create supplementary terms to the existing agreement that significantly strengthen it.

All options must focus on:

·  Improving verification, in particular, achieving adequate transparency and inspector access by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to all necessary Iranian sites, individuals, documentation, and equipment, including rectifying the weakening of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards, i.e. the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and the Additional Protocol (AP), that was done via the JCPOA;

·  Addressing the continued existence of Iran’s uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs and their supporting infrastructure;