THE RUSSIA CONNECTIONWhat Happened to Putin’s Friends? How Europe’s Radical Right Navigated the Ukraine Crisis on Social Media
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine created a dilemma for European radical right parties: these parties had cultivated friendly ties with Vladimir Putin. An analysis of a decade of Facebook posts reveals how these parties strategically managed their communications to avoid the political fallout while maintaining their Eurosceptic agenda.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, European radical right parties that had previously enjoyed cordial relations with Putin’s regime faced an awkward predicament. Some had accepted loans from Russian banks, while others had made official visits to Moscow or publicly praised Putin’s leadership style. Marine Le Pen, for instance, was forced to withdraw electoral leaflets featuring her alongside Putin as French public opinion rapidly turned against Russia.
Our research tracked the social media communication of eleven European radical right parties over a decade (2013-2023) to understand how they navigated this sudden shift. We analysed nearly 370,000 Facebook posts from parties including France’s National Rally, Italy’s Lega, Germany’s AfD, Hungary’s Fidesz and Poland’s Confederation, focusing specifically on how they addressed Russia and the war.
Rather than maintaining their pro-Russia stance or completely reversing their position, most radical right parties employed strategic ambiguity when discussing the war. The overwhelming majority neither defended Putin’s actions nor focused on denouncing Russia, instead employing three key communication strategies.
First, they adopted “strategic silence”. Many parties significantly reduced their mentions of Russia after the invasion, with some like Spain’s Vox barely addressing the conflict at all. Second, they used “topic switching”. When discussing the war, parties frequently redirected attention to issues like energy prices, inflation and the refugee crisis – framing these as consequences of EU policies rather than Russian aggression. Finally, they “blurred their position”. Parties often took ambiguous stances, acknowledging the invasion was regrettable while questioning sanctions, arms shipments or other western responses.
Our quantitative analysis confirms these qualitative observations: while sentiment toward Russia did decline slightly after the invasion, the drop was relatively modest. More tellingly, posts that mentioned Russia became increasingly negative toward the EU, revealing how these parties weaponised the crisis to reinforce their Eurosceptic positions.
Different Parties, Different Approaches
While these overall patterns emerged across the radical right landscape, we observed important variations in how individual parties navigated the crisis. In Eastern Europe, the Czech and Polish radical right parties (SPD and Confederation) were the least apologetic, focusing on the immediate aftermath of the invasion, framing negatively the influx of Ukrainian refugees and taking the opportunity to separate their position from the staunchly anti-Russian mainstream stance.
