SHIPBUILDINGReinvigorating Naval Shipbuilding: Meeting the President's Challenge
To respond to the Trump administration’s call for the reinvigoration of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, policymakers should examine past failures, seek an improved shipbuilding workforce, and consider enlisting the help of close allies like Japan and South Korea.
To respond to the Trump administration’s call for the reinvigoration of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, policymakers should examine past failures, seek an improved shipbuilding workforce, and consider enlisting the help of close allies like Japan and South Korea.
“The U.S. shipbuilding industry is challenged to produce the quantity of ships at the rate required to effect lasting, sustainable growth in the battle force inventory,” Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy Brett A. Seidle told Congress last month. “On balance, cost and schedule performance remain poor; deliveries are approximately one to four years late, and costs continue to rise faster than overall inflation.”
The Navy’s building programs include the Ford-class aircraft carrier, the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, the Virginia-class attack submarine, the America-class amphibious assault ship, the San Antonio-class landing platform dock, the Arleigh Burke–class destroyer, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, two variants of the Littoral Combat ship, and the Constellation-class frigate. Some of these classes have been relatively successful in terms of on-time and on-budget delivery. Arleigh Burke, San Antonio, and America classes experienced early delays, but have for the last 10 years regularly been delivered on time and within cost.
The other classes, however, have been troubled. Beginning with nuclear-powered vessels—unique because of the security and quality control requirements—the Ford, the Columbia, and the Virginia either experienced delays or were delivered with significant maintenance challenges that followed the ships into commission. With conventionally powered vessels, the Zumwalt class experienced delays and cost growth and was ultimately cut to three ships. The Littoral Combat ship—which has two variants built in different shipyards—experienced lengthy delays (PDF). The Constellation class is already three years behind schedule and threatens to be further delayed.
The reasons for the delays and overruns fall into two broad categories. First, there are issues with design as it relates to requirements; these usually manifest in the first ship of the class but sometimes affect the entire class. Second, there are issues with labor and other industrial capacity; these derive from shortfalls in the nation’s industrial base.
