The Battle for Pentagon Acquisition Policy: Tradition Versus New-and-Cheaper
The navy gets an extra Virginia-class submarine and money for shipbuilding infrastructure—everything from wire and steel to drydocks and workforce development. The consistent ‘more ships’ message has been heard, after a decade of repetition. But there was no cash for the messed-up Constellation-class frigate, which could yet be thrown to the DOGEs.
Congress’s budget boost was a reminder that while politicians don’t object to Pentagon efficiency as such, the religious zeal for reformation resonates weakly on Capitol Hill.
Like industry, Congress strongly favors protecting established programs. In its plus-up proposal, among new and radical things, the Collaborative Combat Aircraft program (for fighter-like drones) and missile defense did best.
In air and sea power, Congress seems to be sending a message to support deterrence, power projection and industry. Hill Republicans are in an expansive mood with a shift towards longer-range systems—the B-21 and the new fighters.
Not mentioning the carriers is not significant. The idea of not having carriers is off the table; the last major design change in the carrier program was traumatic; and its unique facilities and skills make it almost impossible to adjust its building rate.
The omission of the F-35 may mean rather more. The new fighter designs and the F-15EX have greater range; even the F-47 will arrive before the USAF’s planned production of the F-35 will be completed, not before 2051.
The F-35’s supporters seem anxious, and Lockheed Martin wasted no time in promoting a Super F-35 after the F-47 announcement.
The navy converted most of its future F-35Bs, capable of short take-off and vertical landing, into F-35Cs early this year, under a new Marine aviation plan. Navy Secretary John Phelan was asked in his confirmation process whether the service planned to upgrade the B models to the new Block 4 standard; he answered noncommittally. That’s significant because it has long been held that US forces would keep all their F-35s in a common configuration.
Missile defense is a big enough field to accommodate many perspectives and players. More money can be used either to accelerate the established primes’ current programs or to open doors for newcomers. And technology that defends the US homeland can equally be used to protect forward bases. Choices between new and established players don’t have to be taken yet, which is probably a good thing given the ferment of policy ideas.
New cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles present an opening for new ideas and new competitors. There is little daylight between the views of the people running Anduril’s Barracuda cruise-missile project and those who did Lockheed Martin’s Common Multi-Mission Truck (CMMT, or Comet). Both teams believe new technology—one-shot injected structures, additive manufacturing in engines, and cheap and powerful data processing—can drop the cost of a cruise missile by an order of magnitude.
They also think new electronic payloads can allow the same vehicle to perform multiple kinetic and non-kinetic missions. The difference is that Anduril is pushing the idea hard but Lockheed Martin—maker of the million-dollar AGM-158 cruise missile—is not.
Overall, a battle may be brewing between the rebels and the establishment for control of the acquisition machine, a situation that will demand cool heads and competence in the Pentagon.
Good luck with that. Defense secretary and former TV host Pete Hegseth has so far escaped consequences for security lapses that would have terminated the career of anyone else, in government or industry. Navy Secretary Phelan had a John Belushi moment when he said the anniversary of Pearl Harbor was June 7.
As the closing roll of the movie told us, Belushi’s Bluto Blutarsky ended up in the Senate—and on the armed services committee for all we know. But that was fiction, and comedy.
Bill Sweetman is a veteran, award-winning journalist and aerospace industry executive. This article is published courtesy of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).
