A British University’s Technology Entanglements with Russia and China

XJTLU’s new Center for China-Russia Humanitarian Cooperation and Development was launched in November 2024. Its stated purpose includes helping Chinese companies enter the Russian market and promoting research ties between China and Russia, as well as academic and cultural exchange. Its Chinese co-director also directs the campus’s technology transfer center, underscoring a risk that technological advancements supported by Britain could end up in Russia.

XJTLU also invited to the center’s opening ceremony a Russian government delegation led by a former Russian senator sanctioned by Britain, the EU, the US, Australia and other countries for providing political and economic support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

XJTLU was founded in an era of warmer ties between China and Western countries and before China and Russia formed their ‘no limits’ strategic partnership. It was also a time when few governments were aware of how strategically important certain critical and emerging technologies would become to their societies, economies and national security.

Beijing and Moscow have further deepened bilateral ties since Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. China has provided political support and a crucial economic lifeline to Russia since heavy Western sanctions cut off Russia’s access to foreign markets and prompted an exodus of foreign direct investment. China has provided dual-use technologies to Russia’s military and is also accused of supplying weapons for its war effort.

In a written response to questions from ASPI, a University of Liverpool spokesperson said, ‘The University of Liverpool has no involvement in XJTLU’s Centre for China-Russia Humanitarian Cooperation and Development, nor with the companies mentioned in your email.’ (These were companies discussed later in this article.)

‘All research and research supervision undertaken jointly between the University and XJTLU is subject to our rigorous due diligence policies,’ the spokesperson said. ‘We have processes to ensure compliance with the UK Export Control and National Security & Investment Act legislation, which were expressly set up to safeguard UK research in a range of fields, and we engage whenever necessary with the government’s Research Collaboration Advice Team.’

The spokesperson also said that XTJLU was an ‘independent Chinese legal entity’ that operated ‘within the confines of Chinese law.’ The spokesperson added, ‘all research and research supervision undertaken jointly between the University and XJTLU is subject to our rigorous due diligence policies.’

The current vice-chancellor of the University of Liverpool, like his predecessor, sits on XJTLU’s board and is its deputy chair. Other senior staff from the University of Liverpool also serve as XJTLU board members. Board meeting locations rotate. Recent locations were the campuses of the University of Liverpool and Xi’an Jiaotong University.

Ties to Restricted Technology Groups
XJTLU has become a research powerhouse, with around 25,000 students and 1,000 academic staff members. It houses several provincial and municipal key research institutes, including a national supercomputing centre, a robotics research institute, and an advanced semiconductor research institute that partners with smart-city company China Huaxin.

In 2024, XJTLU received funding from the PLA’s National University of Defense Technology for a research project called ‘Deep Learning-based Adversarial Sample Defense Technology for Communication Signal Modulation Recognition’. In 2025, an XJTLU research team set a new global record in an international competition in quantum-resistant cryptography. Researchers from the University of Liverpool also collaborate with XJTLU researchers on topics such as radar and autonomous driving.

But this emphasis on cutting-edge research means XJTLU is now operating in a highly contested space, as a new era of strategic technological competition between China and Western countries emerges.  XJTLU partners with numerous groups that have been added to the US Commerce Department’s federal entity list, which imposes trade restrictions but does not limit access to the international financial system. Some were placed on the list after their relationships with XJLTU began, while some were already on the list when XJTLU signed agreements with them.

In April 2025, XJTLU launched a research partnership with the National Supercomputing Center in Wuxi, one of seven Chinese supercomputing groups added to the US federal entity list in 2021 due to their involvement in China’s military modernisation efforts.

XJTLU’s School of CHIPS, which focuses on research and development for advanced computing chips, was co-founded in 2019 by a Chinese government research institute, the Shanghai Institute of Microsystem and Information Technology, that was placed on the US federal entity list in 2024 for acting against US national security and foreign policy interests. The dean of the XJTLU School of CHIPS, Wei Chen, said in 2024 his goal was for XJTLU to design and manufacture its own semiconductors.

The School of CHIPS is also engaging with the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Microelectronics about potential research and design projects. That institute was put on the US entity list in 2024 for ‘its support of China’s “advanced-node ICs” [integrated circuits] and contributions to military modernisation, including development or production of “advanced-node ICs” for military end use and collaboration with parties on the Entity List.’

The School of CHIPS is one of six industry-focused schools housed at XJTLU’s ‘Entrepreneur College (Taicang)’, which was established in 2018 with a focus on ‘industry-oriented research’ and technology transfer in fields including AI, supercomputers, big data, robotics, intelligent manufacturing and internet of things. The Taicang city government provided substantial support for its formation. A range of domestic and foreign companies—including Amazon, German companies Siemens and TUV Nord, and large Silicon Valley based tech incubator Plug and Play—also signed memorandums of understanding with XJTLU’s Entrepreneur College at its launch.

Sugon, a Chinese supercomputer manufacturer that co-established XJTLU’s School of AI and Advanced Computing in 2018, was added to the US federal entity list in 2019 due to the ‘publicly acknowledged’ military end uses of its high-performance computers.

XJTLU also hosts a joint lab with iFlytek, a Chinese technology company added to the US federal entity list in 2019 for its role in the Chinese government’s high-tech surveillance regime targeting Muslim minorities in China’s Xinjiang region.

The University of Liverpool website, which has a dedicated page for the XJTLU partnership and related news, does not mention the China-Russia centre, XJTLU’s joint lab with iFlytek, XJTLU’s new partnership with the supercomputing centre in Wuxi, or the school’s aspirations to make its own semiconductors in China.

British universities are not legally required to vet their partnerships for compliance with US sanctions lists. But many do, including the University of Cambridge, because they wish to preserve access to US research, funding relationships and technology partnerships. US government-funded research and partnerships with American universities may come with conditions that restrict collaboration with sanctioned entities or individuals.

Britain itself has a range of sanctions targeting Russia, including some that prohibit the provision of professional and business services ‘to a person connected with Russia’ and which apply to ‘any UK persons anywhere.’ The British government also placed research and innovation sanctions on Russia in 2022. This included pausing British public funds being spent on projects ‘with a Russian dimension’ and ceasing collaborative projects with Russia. At that time the British government also commissioned an assessment to ‘isolate and freeze activities which benefit the Russian regime’.

In addition to its success in winning an inaugural AUKUS electronic-warfare innovation prize, the University of Liverpool has active grants from the European Commission and US government, including grants from the US Air Force and FBI.

Overall, ASPI’s research into XJTLU exposes a set of problematic UK-China-Russia linkages that span sectors including defence, critical technologies, science-and-technology transfer, commercialisation and industry. Much of the activity outlined in this ASPI research appears to be at odds with the British government’s own defence, foreign policy and national security positions and policies spanning its relationships with the US and EU and strong support for Ukraine. It is also inconsistent with Britain’s broader security partnerships, including AUKUS.

This research shows that Britain and other democratic countries need clearer sets of rules and policies around foreign joint venture universities and research institutes in China. This should include policies on dual-use technologies and guidance on which sanctions and which trade and technology restriction lists may be relevant to universities and research institutes. To inform new policies, governments should work collaboratively with their university sectors and other stakeholders to conduct an assessment of joint venture universities and research institutes in China. Governments should use such assessments to deepen their understanding of the resulting science and technology developments, covering areas such as partnerships (including those with Russia), patents and commercialization efforts.

The China-Russia Center’s Sanctions Links
The XJTLU China-Russia centre’s Russian co-director, Artem Semenov, is an adviser to the Moscow regional government and a member of the public advisory council of Rossotrudnichestvo, a humanitarian and cultural agency under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The EU sanctioned Rossotrudnichestvo in 2022, describing it as ‘the main state agency projecting the Kremlin’s soft power and hybrid influence,’ adding that it acted as an ‘umbrella organization for a network of Russian compatriots and agents of influence, and it funds various public diplomacy and propaganda projects, consolidating the activities of pro-Russian players and disseminating the Kremlin’s narratives.’

A former Russian senator and current adviser to the Moscow regional government, Olga Zabralova, led the Russian government delegation that attended the centre’s launch. Zabralova is sanctioned by Britain, the US, the EU, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Ukraine, Australia, New Zealand and Monaco. She was a member of the Russian Federation Council that ratified the government’s decision to annex parts of occupied Ukraine. XJTLU hosted Zabralova and her delegation at X-Bar, the student activity and recreation centre.

In addition to Zabralova and Semenov, the other members of the Russian delegation to XJTLU included Evgenii Podlipenskii, first deputy minister of investment, industry and science of the Moscow Region; Sergei Kukolev, deputy minister of education of the Moscow Region; and Ekaterina Sizintseva, director of the Dolgikh Regional Technological Lyceum.

The China-Russia centre’s most vocal backers in Russia are both sanctioned government entities; it does not appear to have an official Russian academic institution as a counterpart. Rossotrudnichestvo posted an announcement of the centre’s launch to its website and on its Facebook, Instagram and Telegram accounts. The centre’s opening was also advertised by Russkiy Mir Foundation, a government organisation formed by presidential decree in 2007 nominally to promote Russian language and culture across the globe. The foundation was sanctioned by the EU in 2022 for disseminating Russian propaganda. A delegation from XJTLU also recently visited Russia’s Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (Skoltech) to discuss collaboration and research opportunities. Skoltech was sanctioned by numerous governments in 2022–23.

China, Russia, Research, and a Focus on Technology Transfer
The China-Russia center is located within a nexus of research, industry and technology transfer that involves XJTLU, its Chinese parent institution Xi’an Jiaotong University, the Jiangsu provincial government and the center’s Russian co-director.

The China-Russia center will ‘provide an innovative platform for collaboration in education, culture, research, arts and trade between the two countries,’ the center’s Chinese co-director, Chao Qiuling, said in a press release posted to XJTLU’s website. She praised XJTLU as an institution that ‘combines Chinese and British educational approaches.’ According to the announcement, a key initiative of the center will be to ‘support Chinese businesses, particularly those in Jiangsu province, in expanding into Russian markets.’ The center will also ‘develop specialized courses and training programs.’

Chao wears several hats. Most importantly, she is XJTLU’s party secretary, the university’s most powerful figure. That the XJTLU party secretary herself is directing the China-Russia center suggests it is viewed as an important initiative.

Chao also serves as a director of XJTLU’s technology transfer center, known as the Suzhou Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool Technology Transfer Center Co, Ltd, according to a sampling of data provided to ASPI by Wirescreen, a corporate intelligence research platform. China has a network of technology transfer centers that facilitate commercialization of research outputs. According to its website, XJTLU’s technology transfer center aims to connect ‘scientific and technological achievements’ with ‘local industries’ in the Jiangsu province area that are ‘facing the international technology market.’

XJTLU is working with parent institution Xi’an Jiaotong University to create closer ties between research and industry. A few days before the China-Russia center was launched, Xi’an Jiaotong’s party secretary visited XJTLU and met with Chao. The visit’s theme was deepening research cooperation between the two universities and creating an ‘industry-university-research integration ecosystem’—a catchphrase also used widely across XJTLU’s website and by its various departments.

Semenov, the China-Russia center’s Russian co-director and adviser to the governor of the Moscow Region, is working with the Jiangsu provincial government and the Moscow regional government on a project to help Chinese companies in Jiangsu Province open a development park in the Russian capital, according to an interview he gave at a Jiangsu provincial government event. His role in the China-Russia center completes the circle between XJTLU, local Chinese industry and Moscow.

XJTLU has recently worked to expand its connections with Russian universities and high schools, particularly those with technical specializations. In April 2024, before the center’s opening, a delegation from XJTLU visited Russia to engage with ‘nearly 20 leading Russian universities and high schools.’ Russian students are also eligible for ‘friendship’ scholarships that XJTLU makes available for students from a limited number of countries.

Semenov is also the academic director of a ‘Business with China’ program at the Higher School of Economics, an elite university in Saint Petersburg. As part of a video interview promoting the program, he said they were looking to set up a two-month program with XJTLU allowing participants to earn Chinese, British and Russian educational documents. Semenov said that was unique, because ‘the West refuses to cooperate with [Russia]’ but ‘an angle is opening through China’.

This article has been updated to add statements from the University of Liverpool on its due-diligence and compliance processes.

ASPI granted the Financial Times exclusive early access to this research. Its article is here.

Bethany Allen is head of China investigations and analysis and Danielle Cave is the head of executive, strategy and research at ASPI. Adam Ziogas is a subeditor with The Strategist. This article is published courtesy of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).