CHINA WATCHThe Taiwan Scenarios 2: Warning Signs
At first, it may not be easy to see what’s afoot. The difference between China’s routine coercion of Taiwan and early signs of serious escalation to take control of the island may not be clear.
At first, it may not be easy to see what’s afoot. The difference between China’s routine coercion of Taiwan and early signs of serious escalation to take control of the island may not be clear.
That will be the case whether China tried any of the four main choices it has for attempting to subjugate Taiwan—subversion, a quarantine, blockade or full-scale invasion. ASPI wargamed each on 10 June, with the findings outlined in this series of daily articles, including a description of the scenarios in the first. The next two will examine opening events and longer-term results.
Some indicators and warnings would be observable before China fully launched its operation. Subtle shifts in its political messaging, military deployments, cyber activity, disinformation campaigns and overseas influence operations might all signal intent to act.
In all scenarios, the opening signs will likely include new rhetoric, possibly portraying Taiwan as having crossed a red line. A spike in cyberattacks and information operations, including information operations within China, designed to project and amplify those claims, would also be a likely sign common to all scenarios.
Beijing may then stage what appears to be a routine, large-scale exercise around the island, but with forces venturing beyond their usual training zones. Meanwhile, logistics elements, such as transport convoys, field hospitals, fuel depots and ammunition stores, would quietly amass near embarkation points, and reserve units may mobilize under cover of night.
When these indicators appear together, the risk that Beijing is preparing to act against Taiwan increases significantly. Warning signs will then differ depending on what type of action Beijing is planning to take.
Subversion
In a subversion scenario, we may notice a sudden surge in disruptive incidents against Taiwan’s critical infrastructure—such as failures in electricity supply, rail services, water treatment and air traffic control. Behind the scenes, China’s covert operatives would be orchestrating these attacks, while its information campaigns would seek to undermine public confidence in Taipei. Social-media accounts might amplify rumors of governmental collapse or even mass defections among senior leaders. Any visible redeployment of Chinese military assets could be presented as humanitarian readiness, plausible cover for forces positioned to exploit the resulting chaos.
