Latest U.S. UAV strike in Pakistan signals change of strategy

at foreign al-Qaeda fighters and Taliban guerrillas from Afghanistan, who take shelter in Pakistan between raids into their country to fight American and NATO soldiers. Arab and Uzbek fighters were among those killed Saturday, according to the intelligence official and residents of the area.

The attack on Mehsud, and the fact that it was launched from within Pakistan, should be interpreted as a subtle, or perhaps not so subtle, shift in U.S. strategy in the region. The assumptions on which this strategy is based:

• The war in Iraq diverted attention and resources from the war on terror and terrorists
• There is a need to refocus U.S. energies on more effectively addressing the terrorism problem
• Between 1996 and 2001 Afghanistan provided a safe haven for al-Qaeda
• The Northwest Territories of Pakistan are now al-Qaeda’s safe haven; this is where they train, plan, and regroup
• There will be no solution to Afghanistan until the immunity al-Qaeda now enjoys in Pakistan is removed
• Moreover, the political stability and resilience of Pakistan itself, a country with some sixty nuclear weapons, cannot be guaranteed for long unless al-Qaeda and its supporters in the Northwest Territories are dealt with
• There is no purely military solution to the Afghani problem

To achieve these goals, goals which are essential, in the administration’s view, as a foundation for greater stability in the region, there is a need to do two things:

• Weaken those foreign elements in northwest Pakistan who join with the more extreme elements of the Taliban to destabilize Afghanistan
• Weaken those Pakistani elements who provide support to the foreigners and the extreme elements within the Taliban — and who also threaten the Pakistani government and, more generally, Pakistan’s political stability

Attacking Pakistani insurgents such as Mehsud, and doing so from within Pakistan and with the cooperation of the Pakistani military and the not-always-reliable ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence service, are but a couple of manifestations of this emerging approach.

There are other elements to the Obama approach:

• Pressure the Pakistani military to become a more effective counter-insurgency organization
• Become more involved in trying to resolve some of the thorniest issues separating India from Pakistan (did somebody say Richard Holbrooke?) — as this would allow the Pakistani army to reorient itself from east (India) to west (the insurgents)
• Tacitly approach the more moderate elements in the Taliban to explore areas of possible cooperation
• Demonstrate greater willingness to consider a weaker centralized government in Afghanistan and greater role for regional warlords
• Increase the number of U.S., and NATO, troops in Afghanistan to offer greater security in thee short run
• Intensify and deepen nation-building efforts in that country

There are other elements to the still-in-the-making Obama approach. Will this approach succeed where the Bush administration’s strategy did not? Stay tuned.

Ben Frankel is editor of HS Daily Wire