Obama administration makes stopping nuclear terror key goal

materials worldwide,” the official said.


Shanker and Scmitt write that the review is thus likely to recommend more vigorous intelligence aimed at tracking nuclear smugglers and anticipating terrorist attacks, and more robust actions within the nuclear laboratories to expand abilities to identify nuclear materials in other nations that might be passed surreptitiously to terrorists. All of these efforts could require additional money.


Similar goals have been expressed before, but no previous formal review elevated the threat of nuclear terrorism to a central element of the government’s strategic blueprint.


In comparison, the previous nuclear review, completed under President George W. Bush, called for new nuclear weapons to destroy underground bunkers, including those that might hold unconventional weapons, in Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Libya.


The Obama administration’s review, in addition to elevating the threat of nuclear terrorism and the need to respond to it, also calls for strengthening deterrence — and strengthening America’s “extended deterrence” to protect allies — while reducing the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons over coming years. It cautions that as long as these weapons do exist, the United States must maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.


Shanker and Scmitt note that there has been ample tension during the review, in particular inside the Pentagon, in dealing with President Obama’s pledge to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons” and urge other countries to do the same. Obama’s long-term goal is to eliminate nuclear arms altogether.


Pentagon and military officials said this week that both Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had endorsed the lower warhead levels that the review would propose, a number that already is shaping current nuclear negotiations with Russia and a projected follow-up series of arms talks.


In examining the nation’s nuclear arsenal, the review considered an array of alternatives to the traditional mix of bombers, submarines, and ground-based missiles. For at least the near term, though, warhead numbers are expected to remain sufficiently high to allow the continuation of all three legs of the nuclear triad.


Even as the review enters its final stages, two important issues remain unresolved, officials said. One is the proper approach to maintaining and modernizing the stockpile of nuclear warheads, which would lead to a decision on whether current warheads should be reused and refurbished, or whether they should be replaced by a new generation of weapons. “There is no urgent problem that we need to address in terms of our arsenal or stockpile or maintaining them that requires immediate decisions,” said Stephen W. Young, senior analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists. “They have time to get these answers right.”


The other unresolved matter is whether the United States should declare that it would never be first to use nuclear weapons. Over the decades, the United States deliberately maintained ambiguity in public statements about its nuclear policy: when it would strike, what it would strike and in response to which actions by an adversary. This was deemed important to keep adversaries off balance and give American leaders options.