• Robots Could Help Verify Compliance with Nuclear Arms Agreements

    Ensuring that countries abide by future nuclear arms agreements will be a vital task. Inspectors may have to count warheads or confirm the removal of nuclear weapons from geographical areas. Those hotspots could include underground bunkers and require confirmation that no weapons exist in a location at all. Now, researchers have devised an automated way to ensure compliance.

  • Iran Can Produce Enough Weapon-Grade Uranium for a Nuclear Weapon in 12 Days

    Iran can now break out and produce enough weapon-grade enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon in 12 days, using only three or four of its advanced centrifuge cascades and little more than one-third of its existing stock of 60 percent enriched uranium. This breakout could be difficult for the IAEA to detect promptly, if Iran took steps to delay inspectors’ access. Within four more weeks, Iran can produce enough weapon-grade uranium for four additional bombs.

  • States Invest in Nuclear Arsenals as Geopolitical Relations Deteriorate: SIPRI Yearbook

    The new edition of SIPRI’s annual yearbook finds that the number of operational nuclear weapons started to rise as countries’ long-term force modernization and expansion plans progressed. The size of China’s nuclear arsenal increased from 350 warheads in January 2022 to 410 in January 2023, and it is expected to keep growing. Depending on how it decides to structure its forces, China could potentially have at least as many intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as either the USA or Russia by the turn of the decade.

  • Navigating South Korea’s Plan for Preemption

    South Korea has invested in systems designed to thwart a North Korean nuclear attack by preempting North Korean nuclear launch and attack missiles before they are launched – and also attacking the leadership and command and control nodes that support Pyongyang’s weapons of mass destruction. Clint Work writes that the South Korean approach is understandable, but that there is a catch: The constant talk of preemption “provides easy justification for North Korea to continually build more nuclear weapons. The result is that both sides may now be incentivized to adopt a “go-first” mentality during a crisis.”

  • The Iran Threat Geiger Counter: Moving Toward Extreme Danger

    The Iran Threat Geiger Counter from the Institute for Science and International Security measures on a regular basis Iran’s hostile intentions toward the United States and U.S. allies, and its capability to turn these hostile intentions into action. As with the radiation levels measured by a Geiger counter, any level above zero represents a degree of danger, and over the last six months, the threat posed by Iran has increased. As of May 2023, the Institute assigns Iran a total threat score of 140 out of 180, up from 130 in October 2022, and assessed as High Danger.

  • Producing Medical Isotopes While Lowering the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

    Scientists and engineers at Argonne have been working for decades to help medical isotope production facilities around the world change from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU), which is much more difficult to use in a weapon.

  • Following Yoon-Biden Summit, South Korean Conservatives Criticize “Nuclear Shackles”

    The United States’ pledge to reinforce its nuclear umbrella protecting South Korea has failed to quiet some South Korean conservatives who want their country to develop nuclear weapons. In meetings between President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, the United States vowed to deploy more “strategic assets,” such as nuclear-capable submarines, long-range bombers and aircraft carriers, to South Korea. In return, South Korea stated its “full confidence” in the U.S. defense commitment and reaffirmed it would not pursue nuclear weapons.

  • Increase in Number of Nuclear Warheads In Arsenals of Nuclear Weapons States

    New report shows that the global arsenal of nuclear weapons available for use by the armed forces of the nine nuclear-armed states has increased. At the beginning of 2023, the nine nuclear-armed states had a combined inventory of approximately 12,512 nuclear warheads, of which 2,936 are retired and awaiting dismantlement. The remaining 9,576 nuclear warheads are available for use by the military, and have a collective destructive power of more than 135,000 Hiroshima bombs.

  • Germany's Balancing Act on Nuclear Weapons

    Germany is not a nuclear power, but it is part of U.S. nuclear strategy. In light of the war in Ukraine and the undoing of Cold War-era arms control, the country’s balanced approach is coming under more pressure.

  • Underwater Nuclear Drone: North Korea’s Nuclear Madmen

    One remarkably irresponsible claim by Kim Jong Un is North Korea’s announced testing of an underwater drone that it states can carry a nuclear weapon, able to infiltrate enemy waters and create a deadly radioactive plume of water. Such a detonation could severely contaminate ships and port cities with intense radioactive fallout mixed with water.

  • Iran Could Make Fuel for Nuclear Bomb in Less Than 2 Weeks: Gen. Milley

    Iran could make enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb in “less than two weeks” and could produce a nuclear weapon in “several more months,” according to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley. The 2015 nuclear deal signed by the Obama administration increased Iran’s “breakout” time – that is, the time required to produce one nuclear weapon once a decision to do has been made — to about twelve months, but the Trump administration’s 2018 decision unilaterally to withdraw from the deal has allowed Iran to reduce the breakout time to about two weeks.

  • Survey of Iran’s Advanced Centrifuges - March 2023

    Iran continues to deploy advanced centrifuges at its three enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow in violation of the limitations outlined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). InFebruary 2021, Iran stopped providing declarations about its production and inventory of centrifuge rotor tubes, bellows, and rotor assemblies, and blocked the IAEA access to IAEA cameras recording activities in the enrichment facilities. In June 2022, Iran removed the IAEA cameras from the enrichment facilities, so no recordings exist. Consequently, the IAEA has had no ability to take inventory.

  • Ben Thomas: Spotlighting Careers in Nuclear Nonproliferation

    The goal of Ben Thomas of the Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory is not only to bring universities and colleges from across the U.S. into the nonproliferation network, but also to significantly increase the number of minority-serving institutions, or MSIs, participating in the National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation University Consortia.

  • 12 Days: The Time Iran Needs to Produce Enough Weapon-Grade Uranium for a Nuclear Weapon

    Iran can now break out and produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in 12 days, using only three advanced centrifuge cascades and half of its existing stock of 60 percent enriched uranium. This breakout could be difficult for inspectors to detect promptly, if Iran took steps to delay inspectors’ access.

  • North Korea’s Nuclear Tests Expose Neighbors to Radiation Risks

    Tens of thousands of North Koreans and people in South Korea, Japan, and China could be exposed to radioactive materials spread through groundwater from an underground nuclear test site. North Korea secretly conducted six tests of nuclear weapons at the Punggye-ri site in the mountainous North Hamgyong Province between 2006 and 2017.