BiothreatsProposed budget cuts will weaken state, local ability to handle biological, chemical attacks

Looming budget cuts within DHS are doing little to qualm concern that state and local infrastructure is unprepared to handle a biological or chemical attack. In terms of biosecurity, “we are much better prepared than we were” post-9/11, said Tom Inglesby, director of the Center for Health Security at the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health in Baltimore, Maryland. “But we are not where we need to be, and the progress is, in some cases, somewhat fragile.”

Internationally, the use of chemical weapons in Syria and growing tensions with North Korea are continual reminders that preparedness is vital.National Defense quotes John Fischer, division director, to say that “[DHS] Science and Technology Directorate [S&T] took a 28 percent budget cut when the omnibus bill for fiscal year 2017 was signed in May, and the chemical biological defense division is taking a cut much more significant than that” in fiscal year 2018.

National Defense continues: “The directorate in May released a budget overview for congressional justification, which stated over $58 million would be put toward chemical, biological, and explosive defense research and development for 2017, assuming a continuing resolution would remain in effect for the rest of the fiscal year. Less than $53 million was requested for 2018, according to the document. DHS did not respond to requests for an interview.”

Pandora Report says that 2018 will be a year of harsh budget reductions for biosurveillance and chemical detection programs, as border security will be headlining in terms of priority. The surge of biodefense funding that was seen post-Amerithrax has certainly waned, but there is also concern for complacency and a tendency to go from fire to fire instead of working to establish robust and effective prevention and response mechanisms. “Overall, this fiscal tightening will surely have an impact on prevention, identification, and response strategies for biological and chemical threats, leaving many people holding their breath that the blowback won’t be severe,” Pandora Reportsays.

Now more than ever, it is important we change the narrative of lackluster efforts to defend against biological threats, Jenna McLaughlin writes in Foreign Policy.

Budgetary slashing, lowering of barriers, and an era of increasing globalization and rapid international travel – these are all the things that should remind us that biological threats are not a figment of science fiction. “What was unthinkable back in the day is now quite common and easy,” Inglesby said. “Genetic engineering is now possible with kits from boxes at younger and younger ages with less and less training.”

The dual-use nature of biological research not only has the capacity to lower the barriers to bioweapon development, but can also muddy the waters when determining if research is offensive or defense. “That’s not the only challenge facing those sounding the alarm about biothreats. Government scientists worry that there aren’t enough biologists working on this problem. “We have relatively few biologists working in national security,” Jason Matheny, the director of IARPA, told Foreign Policy. “This is one area where we’re just starting to catch up to the fact.”

“While the future of NBACC [National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center] is still not set, such uncertainty has rippling effects when it comes to staffing,”Pandora Reportsays. “While we consider biological threats a multi-faceted enemy – natural, intentional, or accidental, it is now biodefense efforts that are facing attacks at multiple fronts. The recent de novo synthesis of smallpox has brought many of these concerns to fruition. Whether it be through the advancement of life sciences that poses dual-use risk, severe budgetary cuts, or a shifting focus onto border walls, we cannot afford to allow this threat to be invisible much longer.”