Terrorism in Europe is Geographically Widespread and Multifaceted

Jihadist Terrorism: The Situation in Conflict Areas Outside Europe Continued to Impact the Terrorism Situation in Europe
The so-called Islamic State (IS) lost its last territorial enclave in Syria, but transformed into an underground insurgency in Syria and Iraq and maintained its global network of affiliates. Hundreds of European citizens with links to IS remained in Iraq and Syria. Al-Qaeda again displayed its intent and ambition to strike Western targets, while its regional affiliates aim to integrate and coordinate populations and armed factions in conflict areas. Last year, eight EU Member States were hit by jihadist terrorist attacks.

Left-Wing and Anarchist Terrorism: Greece, Italy, and Spain Continued to Be the Epicenter for These Attacks
The number of left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks in 2019 (26) reached the level of 2016 and 2017 after a decrease in 2018. All attacks took place in Greece, Italy or Spain. The number of arrests on suspicion of left-wing or anarchist terrorism in 2019 more than tripled, compared to previous years: from 34 in 2018 to 111 in 2019, due to a sharp increase in Italy. Private enterprises along with critical infrastructure and public/governmental institutions were among the most frequent targets for left-wing and anarchist terrorists and extremists. Violent left-wing and anarchist extremists continued to pose a threat to public order in a number of EU Member States. Support for Kurdish populations in Syria remained a central topic, and left-wing extremists and anarchists are believed to have travelled to join Kurdish militias in north-eastern Syria.

How Was Terrorism Funded Last Year?
In 2019, several cases of funding the return of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) were observed. FTFs in conflict zones continued to seek financial support from people in Europe for the purpose of covering their expenses or even arranging their return back to Europe. Funding for terrorist groups outside Europe decreased compared to previous years, likely as a result of reduced opportunities for transferring funds to IS. Funds are transferred outside Europe mainly through cash, money services businesses or underground banking, such as hawala, and through combinations of these methods. The abuse of virtual currencies, although promoted by some terrorist groups, has been observed mainly to cover expenses of individuals or small cells.

Extremist groups in Europe mainly receive funds from their base of supporters. Right-wing extremists, for example, continued to use a mix of traditional and innovative methods to finance their activities in 2019. Right-wing extremist groups collect fees from members and donations from supporters and sympathizers, via bank accounts, in cash during concerts or, rarely, through the production and distribution of propaganda material.

The Methods: Firearms and Explosives 
The use of firearms and explosives continued to prevail in ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks and violent attacks inspired by right-wing ideology. Right-wing extremists and terrorists appeared to be increasingly interested in acquiring knowledge regarding the use of explosives. The explosive devices used in left-wing and anarchist extremist attacks were made from an array of readily available materials. 

On the other hand, jihadist terrorists were also observed to show a growing interest in the use of firearms and explosives in addition to bladed weapons. Homemade explosives continued to be used in most of the explosive-related cases suspected of being linked to jihadist terrorism. Knowledge on how to make HMEs was for the most part transferred or facilitated online, including via encrypted cloud-based instant messaging services and social networking sites. 

In the EU, there is little evidence to suggest that a nexus between organized crime and terrorism exists on a systematic and formalized basis. However, there are indications of a transaction-based convergence of low-level criminals and extremists, who frequently overlap socially in marginalized areas. 

Terrorist Propaganda Continued to Be Produced in 2019
Both jihadist and right-wing extremist propaganda incite individuals to perpetrate acts of violence autonomously and praise perpetrators as ‘martyrs’ or ‘saints’, respectively. The impact of official IS media decreased, in terms of volume, content, potency and immediacy, following the loss of most of its territory, media production facilities and personnel. Nevertheless, content supporting IS and containing threats continued to be produced by online supporters of the group under a variety of self-styled online propaganda outlets. Such supporter-generated content and recycled material was continuously disseminated in 2019, thereby partially supplementing the decreased production capacity of official IS media. The measures taken by social media platforms to counter the spread of terrorist propaganda led some groups, to return to ‘traditional’ ways of online communication, including websites and news portals. Suspects arrested for terrorist propaganda in Europe sometimes had a long involvement in jihadist activities.

Europol has produced the TE-SAT, the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, since 2007. The European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) was established in early 2016 introducing policy and organizational coherence to Europol’s support to the EU Member States’ fight against terrorism. Europol acts as a central hub of expertise working to provide an effective response to terrorism.