Afghanistan: Who’s Who in the Taliban’s “Inclusive” New Administration

moving the country’s capital from Kabul to its religious heartland Kandahar in Afghanistan’s southern borders on the Arghandab River. But the outfit still attaches a great deal of importance to the current capital. This was confirmed by its appointment of Mullah Muhammad Shirin Akhund as governor of Kabul. A former governor of the province of Kandahar and a member of the negotiating team in the Taliban’s office in Doha, Qatar, Akhund came to prominence as the chief of its erstwhile leader Mullah Omar’s security until his death in 2013.

Then there is Hamdullah Nomani who has been appointed as Kabul mayor. He was sanctioned in 2014 by a resolution of the UN Security Council and has already served in the same position as the capital’s mayor under the previous Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001. He gained a reputation as ruthless and tough when it came to maintaining law and order and his appointment to the same post in the new Taliban government is an indication of what the Taliban would like to see in Kabul in future.

The critical position of intelligence chief has gone to Najibullah. A hardened veteran of several of the Taliban’s past military campaigns – true to the nature of his appointment – Najibullah (who goes by a single name) has skillfully avoided publicity and remains under the radar.

The Taliban’s choice of Mullah Gul Agha Ishakzai as the minister of finance in the new government should not come as a surprise. Until assuming this position he was head of the Taliban’s financial commission. Under UN sanction  and various other global bodies, Ishakzai is renowned for organizing terror funding for suicide missions and was one of Mullah Omar’s closest confidants.

The decision to appoint a former Guantanamo Bay detainee as the country’s new defense minister will give a headache to many in the West. Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir has extensive battlefield experience spanning more than a quarter of a century. On this critical appointment, the Taliban may be motivated by the fact that should there be an external aggression or an internal power struggle, Zakir’s experience will be invaluable.

While some of these top ministerial positions have been dished out, it is as yet unclear, what future positions some of the most senior Taliban are likely to occupy. These include the emir – or chief – the son of former leader Mullah Omar, Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada, and his deputies Abdul Ghani Baradar, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Muhammad Yaqoob.

They may not have been formally named as ministers in the administration, but it’s hard to imagine that these men, who are recognized as the Taliban’s key political, religious and military leaders, will not play significant roles in any future Taliban regime.

Key Opposition Players
Appointments to these key portfolios provide a pretty good indication on the nature and character of future Taliban governance. In composition and character it appears everything but “inclusive”. The early promises of a system of “stakeholder governance” seem a very distant objective.

There are plenty of dissident non-Taliban leaders that both aspire to – and will eventually demand – plum positions in the country’s future government.

Topping this list is Afghanistan’s former prime minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. At various times both an ally and enemy of the Taliban, Hekmatyar is a survivor in Afghanistan’s complex powerplays. Another to watch is former president Hamid Karzai. A liberal and a nationalist he enjoys a strong powerbase among his moderate Pashtun supporters.

A key negotiator in the current transition to power, Abdullah Abdullah is also a powerful voice on national unity who cannot be ignored, if the Taliban is serious about forming a government of national reconciliation.

Then there are some powerful ethnic contenders like Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Tajik strongmen and resistance leaders Ahmad Massoud and Ata Mohammad Noor, former vice president Amrullah Saleh and Mohammad Karim Khalili, a leader of the persecuted Hazara minority.

Khalili has already warned of armed insurrection if the people he represents aren’t protected from “targeted attacks”. And, more broadly, if the Taliban fails to accommodate the various minority leaders and the constituencies they represent it will most certainly lead to armed resistance, perhaps even all-out war, emerging from the pockets of territory where their power bases remain solid.

Amalendu Misra is Professor, Department: Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University. This article is published courtesy of The Conversation.