THE RUSSIAN MILITARYHow the Russian Military Remade Itself into a Modern, Efficient and Deadly Fighting Machine

By Alexey D. Muraviev

Published 1 March 2022

The war in Ukraine is the first chance the world has had to see the full force of Russia’s new-look military machine – a modernized, professional fighting force that has been completely revamped since Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia. So, what did Russia learn from that conflict militarily, and how are we seeing it play out on the battlefield in Ukraine?

Russian President Vladimir Putin has described his country’s invasion of Ukraine as a “special military operation”. But from the start, this has not been a narrow, limited military campaign.

The operation has been referred to by some as “Operation Z”, based on the distinctive letter “Z” markings on the Russian military and support vehicles. And it’s the largest and most complex military campaign staged by Moscow since its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

It’s also the first chance the world has had to see the full force of Russia’s new-look military machine – a modernized, professional fighting force that has been completely revamped since Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia.

Despite winning that war, the Russians were very critical of their combat performance and embarked on a decade-long defense modernization campaign, fueled by a massive increase in military spending of about US$700 billion.

So, what did Russia learn from that conflict militarily, and how are we seeing it play out on the battlefield in Ukraine?

The Z Force and Chechen Commandos
Russia’s current offensive is being carried out by two new “combined arms” army groups in Russia’s western and southern districts near the Ukrainian border, which were created after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. These forces integrate different arms of the military – such as armor, infantry, missile and artillery, aviation and engineering – and were prioritizsed in the reform campaign.

The initial wave of Russia’s invasion force comprised some 60 tactical battalion groups (up to 60,000 personnel), as well as elite airborne troops and special operations forces, the long-range aviation branch of the airspace force (which delivers nuclear or conventional strikes), and the Russian navy.

In addition, the Russians have utilized the so-called people’s militias of the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk regions – two army corps comprising about 40,000 personnel as their main strike force in eastern Ukraine.

Just like in Syria, the Russians are also using special operations units to perform reconnaissance missions, stage sabotage operations behind enemy lines, and target key political and military leaders, possibly including Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Also noteworthy is the Russians’ extensive use of Chechen special commando units, popularly known as kadyrovtsy.

Known as notorious, battle-hardened, highly motivated and ruthless fighters, the kadyrovtsy are often used to strike fear in opposing forces. The Chechen units have supported most of Russia’s recent military campaigns abroad, including Lebanon, Georgia and Syria. In 2014-15, some Chechen “volunteers” were fighting alongside the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.