IRAN’S NUKESIran Triples Production of Enriched Uranium
Iran has tripled its production of uranium enriched to 60 percent, after slowing down of production earlier this year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on Tuesday. Iran, free of the restrictions it accepted as part of the 2015 deal, is now producing about 9 kg a month of uranium enriched to 60 percent.
Iran has tripled its production of uranium enriched to 60 percent, after slowing down of production earlier this year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on Tuesday.
Iran has “increased its production of highly enriched uranium, reversing a previous output reduction from mid-2023,” Reuters reports, quoting a summary of a confidential report – which the news service had obtained — sent to IAEA member states.
The report notes that Iran is using two facilities — the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) in Natanz and at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) – to enrich uranium up to 60 percent. The IAEA says that between mid-June and the end of November, the two enrichment plants produced about three kilograms a month of uranium enriched to 60 percent.
The IAEA report says that “The agency confirms that, since the end of November 2023, the rate at which Iran has been producing uranium enriched up to 60 percent U-235 at these two facilities combined has increased to approximately 9 kg per month.”
The IAEA says that its inspectors in Iran first noted changes in production at Fordow on 25 November, and that Iran admitted that the increase in production began three days earlier. The inspectors observed the increase in production at Natanz on 27 November. The IAEA says that its inspector’s observations from late November were verified in the past week.
Reuters says that diplomats attribute the enrichment slowdown to secret talks held between the United States and Iran over the release of U.S. citizens held in Iran.
Iran’s current stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent, if enriched to weapon-grade 90 percent, would be sufficient to build three Hiroshima-size bombs.
The 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the world powers limited Iran to stockpiling no more than 202.8 kilograms of enriched uranium, and limited the enrichment level to 3.67 percent.
President Donald Trump’s 2018 unilateral decision to withdraw the United States from the nuclear deal removed the restrictions the deal imposed on Iran’s nuclear-weapons program, thus facilitating a significant expansion and acceleration of that program and dramatically shortening Iran’s “breakout” time, that is, the time it would take Iran to produce one nuclear bomb if the decision to do so was taken.
Between January 2016, when the nuclear deal went into effect, and May 2018, when Trump announced that the United States was withdrawing from the deal, Iran’s breakout time was between 12 and 18 months. As a result of the U.S. withdrawal from the deal, Iran’s breakout time is now assessed to be between 10 and 14 days.
In August, the IAEA’s quarterly report on Iran estimated the size of Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to various levels at 3,795.5 kilograms (8,367.7 pounds), down by 949 kilograms from May.
The agency’s August quarterly report said Iran had 121.6 kilograms (268 pounds) of uranium enriched to 60 percent. In the agency’s May report, it estimated Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium at a little over 114 kilograms (250 pounds). The agency’s February report estimated the amount of 60 percent enriched uranium in Iran’s stockpile at 87.5 kilograms (192 pounds).
The IAEA reported that earlier this year, agency’s inspectors detected “particles” of uranium enriched to 83.7 percent at Iran’s underground nuclear site in Fordow.
The withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear deal has allowed Iran to curtail and obstruct meaningful inspection of its nuclear weapons-related activity. Reuters reports that the IAEA’s recent reports also note difficulties inspectors have recently faced in trying to monitor’s Iran’s nuclear-weapons program:
· Iran was trying to stonewall IAEA officials by denying them visas
· Iran was also engaging in “de-designation of experienced agency inspectors” in an effort to weaken the agency’s monitoring capabilities
· Since February 2022, the IAEA 1 has been unable to access surveillance footage from declared nuclear sites
· As of June 2022, the only recorded data the agency was able to obtain originated from cameras at a workshop in the Iranian city of Isfahan