Ethiopia and Somalia: Conflict Intensifies Over Port Deal
what is now Ethiopia’s Somali region.
However, there’s reason to doubt that Mogadishu would engage in an armed confrontation with Ethiopia, a country whose military spending is three times higher and is part of the coalition fighting the Al-Shabab militant organization within Somalia.
“What can they do with their big neighbor?” asked Medhane Tadesse, who lectures at King’s College in London and Institut des Mondes Africains in Paris.
“They might be involved in destabilization strategies by working with other countries like Gulf powers, probably supporting being a gateway for Ethiopian insurgent groups. But mainly, I think their main agency would be international diplomacy,” Tadesse told DW.
Somalia has received backing from the European Union, the United States and the African Union, which have supported its territorial integrity.
Ethiopia’s New Partnership with the UAE
According to Tadesse, the issue is directly connected with regional geopolitics, namely with a Saudi-led security initiative founded in 2020 with other Red Sea countries.
“Both the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia are not part of it,” Tadesse pointed out. “There has been some kind of evolution of two broad camps. And Ethiopia and Somalia are not in the same camp.”
The UAE has been playing an active role in the Saudi-led intervention in the Yemeni civil war. The UAE holds influence in the south of the war-struck country, mainly through local groups.
Just 250 kilometers (155 miles) further south lies the port of Berbera.
With another ally, the UAE would increase its influence on both sides of the Gulf of Aden, the gateway to the global trade shipping route through the Red Sea and Suez Canal.
As Tadesse explained, teaming up with Ethiopia makes sense for the UAE for various reasons.
“They wanted the hinterland. They wanted that access. But more than that, it’s the security component as well. It’s an alliance making. It’s easy for the Emirates to work with Ethiopia for their own interest,” said Tadesse.
“And the Ethiopian prime minister is also interested in keeping power at any cost. So he’s looking for any financial support, and he can get it from the UAE.”
Tadesse believes that for Abiy, Emirati money and armaments might be a vehicle to consolidate his power against the backdrop of a dwindling Ethiopian economy.
An improved access to sea trade might also be beneficial in this situation. Currently, Ethiopia has to ship its goods via Djibouti.
The port also used to be run by Emirati company DP World, but Djibouti revoked the license in 2018; the matter has since been contested in several court cases.
Ticket to Real Independence for Somaliland?
The main beneficiary of this complex power play might be Somaliland. After its unilateral declaration of independence in 1991, it has established stronger governance structures than the rest of Somalia.
“There is no argument against the recognition of Somaliland,” said Tadesse, who has also advised the Somaliland government in the 1990s.
“But no country wanted to be the first to do it. Even Ethiopia and others were always saying, we’re the second.”
Somaliland’s leader, Muse Bihi Abdi, has already praised the Ethiopian prime minister for abandoning this position.
Whether the “in-depth assessment” promised by Abiy eventually brings the desired recognition remains to be seen.
David Ehl is a freelance journalist.Yohannes Gebre Egiziabher Tarake contributed to this article. This article was edited by Keith Walker, and itis published courtesy of Deutsche Welle (DW).
