China Seeks to Harvest User Data from Global Apps to Boost Propaganda Efforts
It faces a constantly evolving information landscape and adapts its strategies accordingly. One such evolution is from a focus on traditional ‘party-controlled media’ to a more comprehensive approach centered on ‘party-controlled data’ (党管数据). Data is seen in an expansive way: not simply as a source for commercial exploitation, but as a strategic asset that can be used in its propaganda efforts. By exercising control over data—including data collected from subsidiaries operating outside China—the CCP can gain unprecedented insight into societal trends and preferences.
For years, leaders in liberal democracies assumed that digital communications technologies would pave the way for democracy while simultaneously weakening authoritarian regimes. Only when those same digital platforms started to be used to subvert democratic processes, such as through cyberattacks or foreign interference in elections and referendums, did leaders in liberal democracies begin to understand that democratic societies require protection against the malign use of those technologies.
Governments worldwide are currently fixated on mitigating risks associated with TikTok, leading to many countries banning the app from official devices. However, this narrow approach overlooks the broader implications of China’s growing investment in pivotal information technologies. By addressing platforms individually, policymakers fail to recognize the systemic challenge posed by China’s propaganda system and its foundational technology investments. This issue extends beyond China’s domestic information sphere, influencing the global information landscape as well.
China’s propaganda system is a vast structure in and of itself. Under its direct control, or with its direct support, are a web of additional entities whose portfolios contribute to the party’s ability to meet its strategic aims in the information environment. By understanding the ‘invisible architecture’ of China’s propaganda system and technologies, countries can better prepare to mitigate risks that PRC companies pose now or down the track.
Governments must think more holistically about the issue of information campaigns and the technologies that enable them. If governments seek to combat information campaigns only after those campaigns are detected, or their effects felt, then they’re putting themselves in the position of only having the toolkit to respond once the damage is done. The starting points for meeting this challenge must include ensuring that liberal democracies are at the forefront of the deployment of information standards and the core foundational technologies for Web 2.0 and beyond.
Policymakers must develop robust defenses and countermeasures to safeguard against future information campaigns orchestrated by Beijing. By understanding the intricate workings of China’s propaganda machinery, governments and industries can formulate policies to ensure the integrity and security of the global information environment. The report makes a series of recommendations around improving due diligence and transparency in the digital supply chain, data standardization, and regulating technologies used for surveillance and related immersive technologies.
Lawmakers in the United States should rightfully be pleased that they’ve been able to take decisive action against TikTok in a moment of bipartisanship despite Washington’s polarized politics. But they, and other governments, should not rest on their laurels. The challenge posed by China’s propaganda system extends far beyond a single app and requires a comprehensive approach that addresses the broader technological landscape.
Fergus Ryan is a senior analyst at ASPI. This article is published courtesy of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).