Five Disinformation Tactics Russia Is Using to Try to Influence the U.S. Election
Building on this, RT has often given a platform, financing and free rein to media personalities from the states they are targeting, whose genuinely held beliefs suit Russia’s own interests. After all, research confirms that people are more likely to believe claims they have heard time and time again, whether or not those claims are true.
2. Fake news outlets
As part of this case, the U.S. has seized a network of internet domains alleged to have been used to promote false information targeted at specific subsets of the U.S. population. Masquerading as local sites, their content tends to tap into the specific social concerns and controversies that resonate with particular target groups, as well as amplifying core Russian talking points.
We have seen this in the past, when the Kremlin-backed Internet Research Agency set up a fake left-wing news site and conned unwitting freelancers into contributing content for Russian information operations. RT’s past activities show it has no qualms with deliberately camouflaging its links to other media operations and groups.
We know from our research that these sites not only habitually cross-reference each other, they also frequently cross-reference other self-styled counter-mainstream sites to boost their credibility with particular online demographics.
3. Adding fuel to the fire
Another common tactic for keeping content believable is linking it to the fears and concerns that are already important in any society. For example, Russia did not bring the culture war to the U.S., but it has skillfully tapped into American society’s anxieties around the topic. Russian media operations have brought these to the fore without engaging with them in any meaningful way.
Similarly, when Russian sites masquerade as local sources, they prioritize themes that are familiar to their target audiences. Usually, though, divisive topics are embellished with a patchwork of real and fabricated information. Audiences find it hard to pick them apart, and their starting assumptions mean they often aren’t motivated to try.
4. Flipping the script
Moscow has repeatedly denied any involvement in influence campaigns, just as it did in 2018 when the UK accused the Russian state of a series of Novichok poisonings in Salisbury. Back then, Russian politicians and media boosted a complex web of conspiracy theories that mirrored the accusations back at the UK and U.S. security services.
We have seen the “flipped script” response from Russia’s representatives again this time around. Moscow’s ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Antonov, dismissed U.S. allegations as a product of “Russophobia” – the same term used by the Russian embassy following the Salisbury poisonings.
And Russia’s foreign ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, has repeated her favorite theme of recent years, accusing the U.S. of becoming a “totalitarian neoliberal dictatorship”. This might seem laughable from the representative of a state that has criminalized criticism of its invasion of Ukraine. However, bare-faced lies and humorous dismissals often go together in Russia’s information operations.
5. Humor
The Russian state routinely uses humor strategically, and RT has emerged as something of a pioneer in using humor to legitimize Russia’s actions or neutralize critiques.
However, the network doesn’t only use humor to report on international politics. Its trademark approach is to knowingly include itself as part of the joke. Several RT advertising campaigns have used foreign criticisms as a selling point.
The same spirit was clear in the sarcastic response of Simonyan to the latest allegations. In comments posted to Telegram and gleefully reproduced by RT, the editor-in-chief dismissed the charges as U.S. scaremongering “about the almighty RT”. Her words are a perfect example of how RT revels in its status as a “populist pariah”.
Russia continues to refine the way it tries to influence agendas outside its borders, and there’s no suggestion this will stop any time soon.
Precious Chatterje-Doody is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, The Open University. This article is published courtesy of The Conversation.
