Keep the U.S. Government Focused on Combating Foreign Interference Operations
Unmasking and countering foreign interference requires that US government agencies prioritize the issue and have structures in place to coordinate action against multi-faceted threats. In intelligence, law enforcement, and policy circles, the US government, fortunately, is better positioned to address these threats than ever before. In 2019, Congress authorized the establishment of the Foreign Malign Influence Center in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The center, launched in 2022, systematically monitors and assesses nation-state efforts to conduct campaigns against US democracy and national interests. Its reporting on foreign threats to the presidential election established a good practice for government transparency when such threats can affect Americans’ perceptions of election integrity.
The Trump administration will have the option to sunset the center by the end of 2028. It should neither do this nor manipulate resources to focus solely on politically expedient adversaries like Iran and the PRC. Russia, North Korea, and other countries have serious capabilities—from ransomware and other malicious cyber tools to propaganda apparatuses—for disrupting US businesses, institutions, and social services. Maintaining an intelligence hub dedicated to coordinating threat information and analysis across agencies is critical.
Similarly, law enforcement resources must be devoted to holding nation-state actors accountable for breaking the law. Though it is difficult to arrest and punish these foreign actors, indictments provide a record of the tools and tactics that US adversaries use to target the country’s elections, institutions, and citizens. The DOJ’s indictment of two senior Russian state media personnel helped to shut down a sophisticated Russian operation to spread Kremlin messaging to Americans, using unwitting American influencers as conduits, to spread Moscow’s messaging to their fellow citizens. Exposure may not be a foolproof deterrent, but it can materially affect adversaries’ capabilities. Exposing tools and tactics can force hostile nation states to cancel future operations, but it could also lead them to spend time and resources investing in new pathways to conduct interference campaigns. Still, exposure can materially affect adversaries’ capabilities.
Finally, countering foreign interference requires concerted policy efforts to raise the costs for adversaries. Imposing sanctions, communicating messaging publicly and privately to adversaries about the activities that the United States considers out of bounds, rallying US allies to impose similar costs, and even harnessing military and intelligence capabilities to push back forcefully must be part of policy discussions to address foreign interference. The first Trump administration took a range of actions on these issues. A second Trump administration ought to do the same by using the full power of the state to try to change US adversaries’ strategic calculus—no matter which countries wage those campaigns or whom they target.
David Salvo is Senior Fellow and Managing Director, Alliance for Securing Democracy. The article, originally posted to the website of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, is published here courtesy of the GMFUS.The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the views of the author alone.
