IRAN’S NUKESResponse to Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Article on Iran’s Short Timeline to a Bomb
Iran can build a crude nuclear weapon too quickly, in about six months, after a decision to do so, but the regime risks being detected early after its decision to do so and all along its subsequent pathway to a bomb. That time is more than sufficient for a devastating military response by Israel, hopefully supported by the United States and other allies.
On January 22, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS) published an article titled “How quickly could Iran build its first nuclear weapon? Look at China.” Upon reading the article, we felt the need to respond publicly. The BAS article, which summarizes an earlier, longer report, incorrectly characterizes Iran’s nuclear weapons production readiness and does not accurately evaluate the advancements that would be needed for Iran to build even a crude nuclear weapon in short order. We have been evaluating this issue for well over a decade and find the recent article mistakenly mirror images China’s nuclear weapons program which had extensive Russian assistance and could work uninterrupted on all facets of researching, developing, testing, and producing its first nuclear weapon. Not so, Iran. As a result, the BAS article draws conclusions for Iran that are misleading. Our recent findings are summarized in Going for the Bomb: Part I, Pathways and Timelines and Going for the Bomb: Part II, Tasks to Make a Crude Nuclear Weapon
While the Institute takes issue with several elements of the piece, the author correctly identifies multiple steps that are required in the weaponization process and states correctly that many of these steps involve the preparation of non-weapon grade components that can be taken before or in parallel to weapon-grade uranium production. The author then tells the history of China’s first nuclear weapon, which was assembled within weeks after it had the required amount of weapon-grade uranium for it. The author’s longer report is more comprehensive and contains interesting details on China’s program and describes the Iranian effort largely using the Institute’s work. However, he draws the same unsupported conclusion as in the BAS article about the readiness of Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
The author mistakenly equates the Iranian and Chinese nuclear weapons programs and makes unwarranted assumptions about Iran’s program, leading to the misleading claim as stated prominently in the second paragraph of the BAS article, which reads as follows:
“How quickly could Iran make an atomic bomb once it has acquired enough weapons-grade uranium? Some nuclear experts argue it would take Iran anywhere between several months to up to a year. But China’s experience shows that Tehran could build a bomb much faster—in as little as three to five weeks.[1]”
