North Korea Explained: What Americans Need to Know

With 28,000 U.S. troops based in South Korea and potential North Korean military opportunism, the Korean peninsula could potentially become ensnared in a Taiwan Straits crisis. Thirdly, there is a disconcerting lack of trust in the U.S. nuclear umbrella among some South Koreans. There is growing public demand in South Korea for the indigenous development of nuclear weapons. That is concerning and raises the possibility that other regional powers, namely Japan, would develop their own nukes.

What can the United States do to douse North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and promote denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula?
Bennett: In public opinion polls in Korea, perhaps 90 percent of the population believe that North Korea will not be denuclearizing, at least any time soon. So the issue isn’t denuclearization; it is reining in the North Korean nuclear weapon build-up. But it is hard for the United States to shift objectives because if it does, it is admitting past failure. The United States needs to focus on various incremental changes—such as stopping nuclear weapon production at a specific facility—and use information operations threats against the North as leverage. The United States should also commit some of its nuclear weapons for supporting the ROK like the United States does with NATO. It needs to create a regional nuclear balance.

Young: Well, to be frank, the denuclearization of the DPRK is a pipedream at this point and it is not consistent with reality on the Korean peninsula. The United States still officially abides by the utopian pretense of seeking the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Arms control and limiting North Korea’s already growing nuclear arsenal should be the goal. That is more realistic and actionable. Getting North Korea back to dialogue is critical but that does not mean the United States should go soft on the North. There is a reason why Kim Jong-un asked President Trump in 2018 to release all sanctions on the DPRK. Sanctions hurt the political elite of the DPRK. Sanctions are a useful tool in the U.S. toolbox when dealing with Pyongyang but should not be the only option. The United States should seek escalation dominance on the peninsula and should not cede that territory to the Kim family regime in Pyongyang.

What should the United States be doing to maintain and strengthen its military and economic alliance with South Korea?
Bennett: Last year President Biden concluded the Washington Declaration with ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol, seeking to counter Korean concerns about U.S. extended deterrence and its nuclear umbrella in particular. The new administration needs to review the commitments that were made and more publicly explain how they are being fulfilled. For example, President Biden committed to giving Seoul a central role for the first time in strategic planning for the use of nuclear weapons in any conflict with North Korea. The new administration needs to explain how this is being done and what the U.S. goals are in this area over time. The details can reasonably remain classified, but the nature of the changes needs to be publicly explained.

Young: First and foremost, reassuring South Korea that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is solid and credible. That is critical. Economically, the United States should consider allowing tax credits to be applied to electric vehicles manufactured overseas by South Korean companies. That was a major source of economic tension between Washington and Seoul. It would be a sign of goodwill toward U.S. allies and assure them that the U.S. commitment is ironclad. Moreover, it boosts U.S. climate objectives.

How should the United States address the cybersecurity threats posed by North Korea?
Bennett: The United States is suffering regular cyber-attacks from North Korea, China, Russia, and other adversaries. Thus the United States must increasingly “harden” its cyber systems for defensive purposes. It also needs to establish deterrence against cyber-attacks by being able to respond in kind against North Korea and other adversaries. This will require demonstrating the consequences of cyber-attacks to these adversaries to convince them that the United States has the capabilities and the will to hurt them.

Young: North Korea’s cyber capabilities are robust and growing. They are used for revenue generation as well as intelligence-gathering purposes. Given North Korea’s minimal online footprint, it is hard to counter-attack Pyongyang’s hackers. However, there should be more diplomatic pressure on South and Southeast Asian nations that host North Korean IT workers and cyber agents. Sometimes, North Koreans pretend to be foreign exchange students but then spend most of their time using the resources of the host country to launch cyber-attacks on foreign adversaries. That should be cracked down on by responsible members of the international community.

Are the economic sanctions working, should they be expanded or otherwise modified?
Bennett: The U.N. and U.S. economic sanctions have some effect, but Chinese and Russian violations of those sanctions significantly reduce this effect. China and Russia refuse to expand the existing sanctions, and thus new U.N. sanctions are not feasible. But the United States can take unilateral actions and can encourage its allies to act similarly. This might include secondary sanctions against Chinese firms that support trade with North Korea. The United States should also be far more proactive on publicizing the Chinese and Russian violations.

Young: During the summit in Singapore, Kim Jong-un would not have asked President Trump in 2018 to release the sanctions if they had no effect. With that being said, the pandemic highlighted the degree to which North Korea will self-isolate to protect its own internal stability. Within the DPRK system, economic development is secondary, or even tertiary, to the larger goal of regime preservation and ideological cohesion. That is what has allowed the Kim family regime to outlive the Soviet Union and many other communist regimes.

How can the United States better address the human rights abuses in North Korea?
Bennett: North Korean human rights violations need to be publicized more often and with U.S. government support. Many individuals who have escaped North Korea have told their stories in books and articles, but without U.S. government support. The United States and the ROK should also identify individuals being sent to North Korean gulags and the conditions in those facilities. They should regularly broadcast such stories into the North—something that the North Korean elites likely know about, but the frequency of such abuses will likely concern them.

Young: The United States should seek to penetrate the information blockade that the Kim family regime has imposed on its own people. The use of radio broadcasting, balloons filled with leaflets and DVDs, and loudspeakers are threatening to the Kim family regime as it disturbs their iron grip over the information space. This information-centric approach could then be coupled with sanctions as a pressure campaign on the North.

Is there any hope for a peaceful reconciliation between North and South Korea? What can the United States do?
Bennett: At the end of 2023, Kim Jong-un repudiated peaceful unification as even a possibility. In response, South Korean President Yoon recently announced a program to achieve “freedom-based unification,” which will require many changes in North Korea over time to achieve success. The United States can support South Korea by participating in Yoon’s planned information campaign, in part by using it to coerce the North Korean regime, as suggested above. Simultaneously, the ROK needs to prepare itself with the policies and laws and provisions that would support peaceful unification, and the United States should contribute to such efforts where it can.

Young: In 2024, the North Korean government stated for the first time ever that the ROK is a separate national entity and that South Korea is now a foreign hostile enemy. That is a considerable shift in DPRK official rhetoric and inter-Korean policy. So, the United States should recognize the DPRK as a nuclear state. That is the reality and a fact. Pretending that is not the case is not beneficial or helpful for the future of peace on the peninsula. Moreover, this designation could propel Washington and Pyongyang to re-engage in high level talks and the United States should strive for a reduction of nuclear-grade weapon materials in the North. This nuclear designation could then open a multitude of pathways to re-engage with the North.

Are there any novel solutions out there that could make a difference for U.S. interests in the region?
Bennett: The United States and the ROK need to develop approaches to deter North Korean provocations and to rein-in North Korean threat development, especially of nuclear weapons. Using information campaigns could be one key way of doing so. For example, we know from high-ranking individuals who have escaped from North Korea that Kim Jong-un is paranoid about the Reaper drone aircraft because they have been used for leadership targeting in the Middle East. They could threaten Kim Jong-un that every time he does a missile test launch, the United States will fly a Reaper aircraft up to the southern part of the ROK and simulate a leadership strike. If he does a nuclear weapon test, they could threaten to flood Pyongyang with USB drives containing K-pop and other things that Kim hates.

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The United States and the ROK need to develop approaches to deter North Korean provocations and to rein-in North Korean threat development, especially of nuclear weapons.
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Young: Pushing for the recognition of the DPRK as a nuclear state and the establishment of a U.S. embassy in Pyongyang would be a radical break from decades of failed U.S. policy towards the North. However, if the North rejects these overtures, a full-frontal pressure campaign should commence and be continued for multiple U.S. presidential administrations. There should be clarity that this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for the North Korean leadership. If they reject these overtures, the United States should set up a government in exile filled with North Korean defectors and sustain a long-term maximum pressure campaign on the DPRK aimed at regime change.

This article is published courtesy of RAND.