Public healthBioWatch system faces technical, operational challenges

In 2003 U.S. authorities set up a network of air samplers in major cities designed quickly to detect biological agents released in a terrorist attacks. The system, known as BioWatch, faces “serious technical and operational challenges,” according to a review of the project published this month by the U.S. National Academies of Science (NAS).

Tests should be done to establish the effectiveness of BioWatch, and better collaboration is needed to make the system more useful, adds a Committee convened by the NAS to review the system.

DHS established BioWatch after the anthrax letter attacks in 2001, to help officials respond swiftly to the release of bioterror agents. It comprises of monitoring devices that sample mainly outdoor air in more than thirty U.S. cities, including New York and Washington, D.C. Samples of air are collected and tested in local laboratories for traces of a list of potential bioterror agents every twenty-four hours.

Emerging Health Threats reports that with running costs of $80 million over the next ten years, and a planned upgrade of the system set to raise this to $200 million, DHS called on the NAS to evaluate how well the existing system works to identify threats, and the potential it may have to do this in the future.

The NAS-convened committee found that the system was not well integrated into the U.S. public health system. BioWatch relies on local health departments and healthcare systems to analyze and respond to any detected threats. This amounts to an “awkward and organizationally challenging” set-up for responding to any identified agent, they write in the report. “The BioWatch system needs to establish a more effective relationship with public health systems where it is deployed.”

Currently, the local authorities managing BioWatch devices are not given any extra financial support. The committee says the costs of analyzing and responding to threats are an extra burden to public health authorities, which should be compensated for BioWatch-related work and staff training.

As well as investing in the workforce and operational capacity, the DHS needs to help public health decision makers to respond confidently to any signals generated by the system, according to the report — enabling BioWatch to become more than a tool for identifying potential biological threats, functioning instead as a complete decision-making system.

This could be done by providing additional information to users, which can guide risk assessments of each pathogen-identification incident and help them to plan effective responses. “DHS’s existing Bioterrorism Risk Assessment program was developed for the specific purpose of providing input for this kind of decision making,” says the committee, which urged a close link between the two systems.

Emerging Health Threats writes that the committee also notes that the current BioWatch system was set up so quickly that it was not tested, validated or evaluated. DHS should test the performance of the system at all existing sites, it says, to find out how the sensors perform at detecting each specific pathogen. This should be carried out before any decisions about upgrading the system are made.

The next generation of sensors, expected to help detect pathogens faster than the existing technology, should also be thoroughly tested before use, adds the committee.