The Iran decision: the pros and cons of the military option -- I

Foreign Affairs (January-February 2012). I summarize below some of his arguments for attacking Iran. Tomorrow I will summarize the arguments against such an attack.

The arguments for military action
Those who argue for military action to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons do not say such action would not be costly or risky. They argue, rather, that of the two options we face – allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons or attacking it militarily to stop it from doing so – an attack on Iran would be the least bad option.

Their argument is based on three assumptions: a nuclear-armed Iran would be very bad for the United States, the region, and the world; a military action to defang Iran is possible; the retaliatory campaign Iran is likely to launch following such an attack can be mitigated. These three assumptions are further developed this way:

The dangers of a nuclear Iran
1. A nuclear-armed Iran would severely limit the U.S. freedom of action in the region, threaten U.S. interests, and undermine U.S. initiatives. Would the United States have attacked Iraq in 1991 or 2003 if Iraq had nuclear weapons? Would NATO have attacked Libya if Qaddafi had nuclear weapons? If a country has nuclear weapons it does not mean that it will use them to attack other countries, but such a country must be handled with greater care and consideration, and its views and interests must be taken into account more than otherwise would have been the case.

2. Even if Iran would not use, or threaten to use, its nuclear weapons, these weapons would offer cover for Iran’s conventional and subversive campaigns against other countries. Confronting a nuclear-armed nation is always more problematic than confronting a non-nuclear nation, and Iran may well feel greater freedom to engage in risky and destabilizing behavior knowing that its nuclear weapons would make other countries hesitate about confronting it.

3. Iran may well decide to share its nuclear weapons with state and non-state allies. The five original members of the nuclear club, and the four countries that joined the club later, have not shared their weapons with others, but an argument can be made that Iran, which sees itself as a leader of the Shi’as, may be tempted to give a couple of nuclear warheads to Hezbollah. This may allow Iran to achieve some of its strategic goals (for example, inflicting egregious injury on Israel) while maintaining deniability.

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