Morocco changes offer U.S. “very important opportunity”

of Mubarak’s relentless suppression of any opposition to his rule. As a consequence, the PJD has learned that it must cooperate with other important political tendencies in the country if it wishes to succeed, while it remains wholly unclear whether the Brotherhood will be able to learn this lesson quickly enough or find other partners willing to cooperate should it manage to come to power as the PJD has in Morocco.

HSNW: With the election of a similarly moderate Islamist party in Tunisia, what are the implications for the region? With the Arab Spring, many Islamist parties have gained tremendous influence compared to the secular parties. Will this prove problematic for these nascent democracies as well as for the region as a whole? Are there any potential dangers or pitfalls with an increasing number of moderate Islamist parties taking power?

RH: Western media tend to not discriminate among the differences that should be considered in assessing the impact of Islamic parties on the opportunities and challenges for political and social development. It is important to distinguish among the Islamist parties in each country and their future role in government. Similarly, the question of whether non-Islamists political forces will be able to exert influence in these emerging governments cannot be adequately addressed without looking into the political environment in each country.

In Morocco, for example, the majority of the already very well established political parties represent constituencies that are clearly more “secular” than “Islamist” and the PJD will be required to find common ground with these political movements if it is to govern effectively.  Just as clearly, Tunisia, despite the recent electoral victory of an Islamist political party, will need to govern within the context of a society with a well established middle class largely committed to secular values and a market oriented economy strongly tied to its prosperous tourist industry. To even attempt to do otherwise would surely provoke very substantial resistance from various elements of the country’s business and social classes who already have indicated their commitment to preserving the foundations of a moderately efficient economy that has produced an effective middle class and a set of social norms and expectations that few would be willing to see disappear without a vigorous defense.

In Egypt, the situation is less clear.  The repression of the Mubarak regime resulted in a body politic that was poorly organized with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood and