Cunning Iran wins again // By Ben Frankel

—-When, in the fall of 2007, the UN was beginning to move in a more determined fashion toward tightening sanctions on Iran, the Bush administration published a small portion of the December 2007 National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) which argued, startlingly and incredibly, that Iran had “halted” its nuclear weapons program in 2003. In February 2008 we wrote that the NIE document was “strange, misleading, and poorly timed” (Ben Frankel, “U.S. still fighting for sanctions on Iran, but with a weaker hand,” 19 February 2008 HSNW). We were joined in this assessment by the very bosses of the team which produced the NIE — then-Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell and then-CIA Director Michael Hayden. McConnell admitted, in a March 2008 testimony in Congress, that the “wording” of the December NIE was poor, and that inferences drawn from it that Iran had stopped its relentless march toward the bomb were wrong. As for Hayden: “CIA Director Michael V. Hayden said Sunday that he believes Iran is still pursuing a nuclear bomb, even though the U.S. intelligence community, including his own agency, reached a consensus judgment last year that the Islamic Republic had halted its nuclear weapons work in 2003” (Los Angeles Times, 31 March 2008). We argued that:

The strange, misleading, and poorly-timed NIE dealt a near-mortal blow to the administration’s own efforts to continue and intensify the economic sanctions on Iran. The administration thus contributed to the creation of a situation in which it is more likely than not that the world will either have to accept a nuclear-armed Iran, or go to war to stop it. With its own inadvertent weakening of the case for economic sanctions (Iran, after all, had “halted” the work of a small element of its nuclear weapon program), this middle option of imposing penalties short of war on Iran is becoming less

—-With the Iranian menace growing, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice embarked on an effort to form a Arab Sunni-Israeli-U.S. coalition to contain Iran and resurgent Shi’ism in the Middle East. The Obama administration continued its predecessor’s policies, with Obama, in his 2009 speech in Cairo, calling for opening a new chapter in the relationship between the United States and the Arab world. This plan was dealt blow with the election of Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel, and the formation of a hawkish coalition government there. Netanyahu’s less conciliatory policies toward the Palestinians may or may not be justified from the perspective of Israel’s security, but there is little doubt that lack of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front hampers any effort to create a grand Sunni-Israeli-U.S. coalition against Iran. The stalemate in the negotiations between Israel and Palestinians not only makes it difficult for moderate Sunni Arab regimes to cooperate with Israel against Iran, but it also allows Iran to present itself as the champion of Palestinian rights — rights, the Iranians charge, which the pro-U.S. Arab regimes no longer fight for.

—-The latest escape for Iran was provided this past weekend by Brazil and Turkey. Leaders of the two countries met with Iranian leaders in Tehran and, with much fanfare, announced a nuclear deal which, according to the president of Turkey, now makes further UN sanctions on Iran unnecessary and unjustified.

A close examination of the Iranian-Turkish-Brazilian deal show that it, too, is largely an empty gesture, a sleight of hand which will likely delay, for a considerable period of time, any meaningful international action against Iran while allowing the Iranians more scope to continue their relentless, determined march toward the bomb.

The Iran-Brazil-Turkey nuclear deal
The deal requires that Iran will send 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) — uranium Iran had enriched in its centrifuge farms — for storage in Turkey, where international monitors would ensure the safekeeping of the material. After a year, Iran would get 120 kilograms of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (the BBC provides the full text of the agreement)

Nathan Hodge asks the right question; Does this deal mean that the crisis is solved, or is Tehran just playing for time while it gets closer to the bomb?

The timing of the deal, which Iran is trumpeting as a diplomatic victory, is not accidental, as the United States and its allies were expected to push for a tougher round of international sanctions next month, after Lebanon gives up its rotating presidency at the UN Security Council (the Lebanese government is held hostage by Hezbollah — the Lebanese Shi’ia organization is better armed than the Lebanese military — and Hezbollah, serving as Iran’s agent, let the government know that it would not be wise to allow a discussion over Iranian sanctions while Lebanon was presiding over the Security council).

Hodge notes that, at first blush, the deal mirrors an arrangement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) advanced in October (an initiative backed by Western governments) to send out Iran’s uranium for enrichment.

The proposed shipment of 1,200 kg is enough, after being further enriched to 90- percent or higher, for a single, crude Hiroshima-style bomb. The problem is that since Iran has continued to enrich uranium, and has done so at an accelerated pace, its low-enriched uranium stockpile is now larger than it was when the IAEA deal was originally proposed last October.

Iran currently enriches uranium at a gas centrifuge facility in Natanz. This is where uranium hexafluoride gas — the feedstock for enrichment — is spun through centrifuge cascades to separate out uranium-238 (the most common isotope of uranium) and uranium-235 (the fissile material for a bomb).

Iran is building a second centrifuge facility at a site near Qom, although no centrifuges have actually been installed, the best Western intelligence services can tell.

How much low-enriched uranium Iran would still have after the fuel deal? Joseph Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund and an expert on nuclear nonproliferation, told Hodge in an e-mail that Iran’s reported deal “is more than expected,” although he adds a few caveats.If Iran carries through — and that is a big if — the deal could buy some breathing space in the continuing crisis. But the May deal [the Brazil-Turkey-Iran deal] is worth less than the October deal [the IAEA proposal] for two reasons. First, Iran has continued to produce low-enriched uranium, so the 1,200 kg it will ship to Turkey is a smaller percentage of its total supply. The latest IAEA report in February gave them an estimated 2,065 kg at the end of January. They are producing about 125 kg per month, so that could be a total of 2,565 kg by the end of May. Thus the 1,200 kg shipped would represent only half their supply.Second, Cirincione told Hodge, the proposal brokered with Turkey and Brazil may do little to allay concerns about Iran’s nuclear intentions. “Suspicions and mistrust will remain high,” he told Hodge. “Western states will continue to believe that Tehran is playing Lucy and the football with the LEU — offering it up for exchange, only to yank it away at the last minute.”