And one more thing // by Eugene K. ChowTerrorist attacks and the false specter of security

Published 21 November 2011

With the recent passing of the tenth anniversary of the creation of the Transportation Security Administration, the United States would benefit greatly from a candid discussion on the nature of terrorism and the current rhetoric surrounding it; the fact is, no wall, law, or interrogation technique will keep us 100 percent safe from violent terrorist acts; the sooner we acknowledge this morbid reality, the sooner we can begin focusing on a long under-emphasized aspect of counterterrorism: the psychological dimension of terrorism – an area where we are losing ground

 

With the recent passing of the tenth anniversary of the creation of the Transportation Security Administration, the United States would benefit greatly from a candid discussion on the nature of terrorism and the current rhetoric surrounding it. So far every attempt made by terrorists to attack an airplane, even if it is foiled, is labeled as a failure in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, however, doing so  plays directly into the hands of terrorists.

No wall, law, or interrogation technique will keep America 100 percent safe from violent terrorist acts. Richard Clarke, chief counterterrorism adviser to both President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush, noted that the task of defending the United States from one person or a small group is “impossible.” The sooner we acknowledge this morbid reality, the sooner we can begin focusing on a long under-emphasized aspect of counterterrorism — the psychological dimension of terrorism, an area where we are losing ground.

Currently, terrorists are dominating the United States in the psychological arena as even a failed attack is viewed as a failure of domestic security and counterterrorism efforts. An effective counterterrorism policy should not be measured in its ability to prevent every single attack, but rather in its domestic policing efforts, direct action against terrorist networks abroad, and the bolstering of weak and failing nations that are at risk of becoming safe havens for violent ideological extremists. Therefore, to successfully combat fear — terrorism’s primary weapon — we must operate more effectively in the theater of spectacle, and reframe the public debate.

Terrorism and counterterrorism have real effects – bombs go off, planes fall from the sky, people get killed – but, unlike more conventional military of police operations, terrorism and counterterrorism are primarily psychological spectacles aimed at swaying the public. Faith in the government’s ability to provide security is essential to its legitimate monopoly on the use of force and why citizens freely surrender some of their rights. A terrorist’s goal is not to kill innocent civilians as an end in itself, but rather a means to sow doubt and fear that strike at the very foundation of governance. Terrorist groups, lacking the resources to wage a traditional war, rely on symbolic attacks that have broader unsettling repercussions outside of the physical damage or loss of life that the assault itself may cause.

For instance, for al Qaeda, the success of 9/11 was not the extent of the damage inflicted by