The worse, the better: Assad’s troubles may hasten Hezbollah’s take-over of Lebanon

dominant position has to do with the deep divisions among and within the non-Shi’a groups.

There are already indications, however, of the weakening position of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The disintegration of the Assad regime has given courage to Hezbollah’s Lebanese opponents. Critics of Hezbollah now dare criticize the organization openly on TV, and write critical articles in leading Lebanese papers – something they would not dare do only a few months ago. More and more Lebanese politicians call for disarming Hezbollah. For example, last Thursday, former Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora wrote an op-ed article in which he said that “the defense of the country must be carried out only by the state and its institutions, not by a political groups,” thus addressing directly claims by Hezbollah that it is arming itself in order to protect Lebanon. He also said the political coalition he leads – the 14 March Alliance, a coalition of political parties and independents united by their anti-Syrian regime stance — – will be willing to participate in a “national dialog” with other Lebanese political groupings, “but only if the [dialog] will deal with the central issue of arms which are not in state hands.”

Even Najib Mikati, the current Lebanese prime minister appointed at the recommendation of Hezbollah, recently approved the continuation of financing of the international court at The Hague which is investigating the 2005 assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri by Hezbollah operatives, and he also instructed the Lebanese intelligence services to provide leaders of the 14 March Alliance with information about continuing plots by Hezbollah to kill leaders of the group.

As Avi Issacharoff writes in Haaretz, it appears that the various political groups in Lebanon, especially those affiliated with the 14 March Alliance, are smelling Hezbollah’s blood. Issacharoff, a respected military analyst, notes that for a while yet, Hezbollah will remain a formidable military force, and that it is likely that the organization will use its strength to try and get out of the ever more problematic situation in which it finds itself as the Assad regime continues to weaken.

The organization may thus choose to start another war with Israel, as it did in 1994 and 2006, or may launch an assassination campaign against political adversaries in Lebanon. The purpose of both moves would be to facilitate the take-over of Lebanon by Hezbollah.

“In 1992 Hezbollah joined the country’s political system,” writes Issacharoff.

The policy [Hezbollah leader Hassan] Nasrallah has led since then aimed at taking over Lebanon while using minimal force…. The war in Syria manifests itself in Lebanon almost every day – chaos is everywhere. The government is helpless, and Hezbollah may soon find itself in a civil war against a variety of groups already arming themselves across the country. Not to worry: this may not be the optimal scenario Nasrallah had envisioned. He wanted to take over Lebanon through the voting booth. But even in the event of a renewed civil war in Lebanon, at the end of the day Hezbollah will emerge from the campaign with a victory.

In analyzing the prospects of the working class in the industrial countries rising in support of a communist revolution, Lenin said: “The worse, the better.” He meant that the worse the condition of the working class is, the better the prospects of a communist revolution.

It appears that Nasrallah has adopted a similar line of reasoning: Lebanon is already in chaos, Hezbollah’s Lebanese opponents are emboldened, and Nasrallah’s Syrian patron is weakening. What better way to make Hezbollah’s take-over of Lebanon complete than by plunging the country into a deeper chaos still – by launching a war against Israel, thus inviting a devastating Israeli retaliation, and by launching an assassination campaign against leaders of rival groups, thus deepening the turmoil and agitation in Lebanon? In the skirmishes with Israel, Hezbollah would fire a few thousands of rockets into Israel, as it did in summer 2006, thus bolstering its claim to be a better defender of Lebanon than the toothless Lebanese army. As domestic turmoil and inter-ethnic strife intensify, Hezbollah could present its take-over of Lebanon as the only way to impose stability and calm on the country.

Growing domestic chaos and a short war with Israel would thus serve Hezbollah’s interests just fine. The worse, the better.

Ben Frankel is the editor of the Homeland Security News Wire