Research on enhanced transmissibility in H5N1 influenza: the debate continues

Authors of the commentaries are prominent scientists, including:

• Ron Fouchier of Erasmus MC Rotterdam in The Netherlands, Adolfo García-Sastre of the Mount Sinai School of Medicine, and Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison (“The pause on avian H5N1 influenza virus transmission research should be ended,” mBio 3, no. 5 (10 September 2012): e00358-12 [doi:10.1128/mBio.00358-12]), lead authors of the two papers that began the controversy, argue that in the eight months since the moratorium was agreed upon, the international research community has had sufficient time to review biosafety and biosecurity measures and that H5N1 transmission studies ought to proceed.
• Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (“Research on highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus: the way forward,” mBio 3, no. 5 (10 September 2012): e00359-12 [doi:10.1128/mBio.00359-12]), contributes his voice as a representative of an organization which is a key funder of influenza research. Although Fauci acknowledges that the benefits of gain-of-function research outweigh the risks, he argues that scientists have yet fully to meet their responsibility for engaging the public in weighing these matters and making the case for proceeding. He outlines how the U.S. government plans to augment policy guidelines related to “dual use research of concern” like the experiments on enhanced influenza transmission.
• Marc Lipsitch and Barry R. Bloom of the Harvard School of Public Health (“Rethinking biosafety in research on potential pandemic pathogens,” mBio 3, no. 5 (10 September 2012) :e00360-12 [doi:10.1128/mBio.00360-12]), explain why they view H5N1 with enhanced transmissibility as a “potential pandemic pathogen,” representing an even greater threat to global health than Ebola and other biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) pathogens. They argue that research on enhanced H5N1 and other potential pandemic pathogens requires a new, more stringent set of guidelines for safety, thorough public discussion of the risks and benefits involved, and global guidelines for laboratory procedures, among other measures to minimize the risk of laboratory-released infections or epidemics.
• Ian Lipkin of Columbia University (“Biocontainment in gain-of-function infectious disease research,” mBio 3, no. 5 (10 September 2012): e00290-12 [doi:10.1128/mBio.00290-12]), argues that once research on enhanced strains of H5N1 continues it may be advisable to conduct the work only in BSL-3 Ag laboratories that meet additional, enhanced guidelines for handling agents with pandemic potential. Lipkin proposes that any course should be charted in consultation with and oversight from the global scientific and regulatory community.
• Stanley Falkow of Stanford University (“The Lessons of Asilomar and the H5N1 ‘Affair’,” mBio 3, no. 5 (10 September 2012): e00354-12 [doi:10.1128/mBio.00354-12]), provides perspective on the H5N1 research moratorium based on his own experiences with a similar situation in the 1970s, when research in recombinant DNA techniques was halted while a committee of scientists and non-scientists could establish a set of guidelines for conducting the work safely. Falkow argues that research on H5N1 viruses with enhanced transmissibility should move forward once scientists work with the public to establish standardized guidelines using common sense and scientific creativity.

“This is a historic time in science,” says Casadevall. mBio has solicited the views of experts in the field, he says, in order to provide a venue for recording the arguments for and against continuing H5N1 gain-of-function research. “Society is asking for a pause of research that is perhaps the best defense against pandemics because of concern about both biosafety and biosecurity.” With the research moratorium continuing well past the 60-days originally planned, it is time these conflicting views were aired in a public forum, he says.