Israel’s operation in Gaza: limited goals – for now, I

of the regime’s military bases, found themselves in possession of the regime’s chemical munitions.

Iranian agents paid millions of dollars to some rebel leaders for about 800 nerve and mustard gas artillery shells and warheads, and arranged for Hamas operative to go to Libya to finalize the details of the munitions delivery to the Gaza strip.

Those Hamas operatives never made it to Libya. In early April 2011, Israeli special forces operating in Sudan killed two top Hamas military leaders who were on their way to Libya to finalize the chemical munitions deal. One of those killed was Abdul Latif Al-Shaqr, who was the successor of Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh, the top Hamas official who was assassinated by Israeli agent in his hotel room in Dubai in 2010 (see “Hamas operative killed in Sudan successor of operative assassinated in Dubai,” HSNW, 8 April 2011).

Israel’s three possible goals
There are three possible goals for Israel’s Cloud Tower operation:

1. Reestablish deterrence. Hamas suffered a heavy blow in the December 2008-January 2009 Cast Iron operation. For three years or so, the organization appeared content to rebuild its military capabilities and concentrate on governing the Gaza Strip. There were sporadic rocket launches into Israel, but those responsible were even more extreme Palestinian organizations such as the Islamic jihad.
Over the past few months, however, more and more rockets launched against Israeli civilians were launched by Hamas squads, and Hamas publicly announced it was responsible for the attacks. Hamas militants also increased their attacks on Israeli military patrols along the Gaza Strip border.
It appears that Hamas calculated that the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the fact that Israel is now in the midst of an election campaign (the elections are scheduled for 22 January), would make it more difficult for Israel to retaliate, thus allowing Hamas to bolster its credentials as a fighting organization – and do so on the cheap.
Israel thus had a need to re-establish and strengthen its deterrence by inflicting a painful punishment on Hamas, its leadership, and its military capabilities.

2. Destroy Hamas startegic capabilities. Israel was also watching, with increasing anxiety, the growth in Hamas military capabilities, especially mid-range missiles from Iran. The collapse of the Mubarak regime in Egypt and the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood turned the Sinai Peninsula into a lawless no-man’s land, allowing the free flow of weapons of all kinds from Iran to Hamas.
The growing number of missiles in the hands of Hamas; the availability of loose chemical weapons in Libya and the active efforts by Iran and Hamas to get their hands on these weapons; the smuggling into Gaza of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons; and Hamas’s efforts, with the aid of Iranian engineers, to build its own UAVs – all these have increased the pressure on Israel to act now to destroy these capabilities in order to diminish Hamas’s ability to attack Israel – especially, to diminish the organization’s ability to attack high-value strategic targets.

3. Finish off Hamas. Hamas, as functioning organization, can be finished off: Israeli intelligence closely follows dozens of Hamas military and civilian leaders. If the order is given, the organization can be “decapitated” within hours. Hamas buildings and centers of power can be destroyed as well. The ideology of Hamas will not go away, but the ability of a leaderless organization to function as a governing entity will be diminished, if not destroyed altogether.

It appears that Israel is pursuing the first two goals. There is a reluctance in Israel to destroy the leadership of Hamas and diminish its ability to run the Gaza Strip – not because of any sympathy for Hamas, but because there is no one else who would come in its place to rule the territory. The Palestinian Authority, which governs the West Bank, will not agree to assume power under such conditions for fear of appearing to be a tool of Israel’s policy. The Gaza Strip will thus either descend into a state of anarchy, or fall under the sway of even more extreme Islamist organizations.

Tomorrow: what would constitute a successful result for the operation, and can such success be achieved; the role of the United States and Egypt

Ben Frankel is the editor of the Homeland Security News Wire