The two-track Syria strategy of Iran and Hezbollah

2. The strategic interests of Iran and Hezbollah are accompanied by religious-sectarian solidarity with Syria’s Shi’ite population (an estimated 400,000-450,000 strong), and also with the Alawite sect which has been ruling Syria since 1970. That solidarity has been proclaimed by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah recent speeches, and has become stronger since the Syrian Shi’ites and their holy sites in Syria became targets for harassment by the rebels (particularly by organizations affiliated with al Qaeda, such as the Al-Nusra Front, which considers Shi’ites as infidels).

3. With these dangers in mind, Iran and Hezbollah employ two parallel strategic tracks: the first, immediate track is intended to prop up the Syrian regime’s ability to survive and continue governing, with the aid of military, economic, political, and propaganda support. The second track, planned as an intermediate- and long-term strategy, is intended to make it possible for the Shi’ites and Alawites to defend themselves by creating a “popular army.” The Meir Amit Center estimates that this popular army will consist of 100,000-150,000 militiamen. It will give Iran and Hezbollah a foothold in the areas populated by Shi’ites and Alawites, making the two communities important factors in the internal Syrian arena in the post-Bashar Assad era.

4. In addition to providing a response to the potential dangers, Hezbollah strives to acquire advanced military capabilities from the Syrian regime, the possession of which could deter Israel and challenge its technological superiority. These advanced capabilities include advanced surface-to-surface missiles (such as the Iranian Fateh-110s), anti-ship cruise missiles (Russian Yakhonts), and anti-aircraft missiles (Russian SA-17s and other systems). Hezbollah also wants, in the assessment of the Meir Amit Center, to establish a foothold for terrorist attacks against Israel from the Golan Heights by exploiting the weakness and strategic distress of the Assad regime. Hezbollah’s desire for game-changing weapons and its willingness to “help” the so-called “Syrian popular resistance” in the Golan Heights were publicly stated in a speech given by Hassan Nasrallah on 9 May 2013. Israeli policy, as publicly stated by Israeli prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu, was “to prevent, the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah and to [other] terrorist elements.”

5. The Iranian policies regarding the civil war in Syria are handled by the Qods Force (commanded by Qassem Suleimani), with Hezbollah as Iran’s main subcontractor. Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war is manifested by their sending several thousand operatives to participate in the fighting in Shi’ite regions. Hezbollah also supports the Syrian regime in several other ways: training Syrian forces in guerilla warfare, intelligence, securing the Syrian-Lebanese border, taking preventive measures inside Lebanon, and propaganda campaigns.

6. The operatives sent to Syria play an important role in the fighting, especially in locations where Hezbollah (and Iran) have sectarian-religious interests: the Al-Qusayr region, south of Homs, near the northern border with Lebanon, where there is a Shi’ite population living within a Sunni area (the Syrian army, with Hezbollah support, appears to have retaken control of the Al-Qusayr region on Tuesday, 4 June 2013); and the grave of Al-Set Zaynab, located south of Damascus, an important holy site for Shi’ites and an important pilgrimage site. Hezbollah continues to be sucked deeper into the civil war in Syria despite its losses and the political price it is forced to pay: so far, more than one hundred of its operatives have been killed (most of them in the campaign for Al-Qusayr), and criticism of Hezbollah has increased among its opponents in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world.

7. Hezbollah was involved in the first year of the civil war in Syria, but was careful to keep a low profile. In 2012 it sent a limited number of its military operatives to Syria, mainly as advisors and for security missions. Hezbollah was actively drawn into the war (as opposed to Iran’s caution) during the first half of 2013. This was because, in the assessment of both Iran and Hezbollah, the survival of the Syrian regime was in jeopardy, and that Shi’ite religious-sectarian interests were being threatened.

Despite its having fallen into the Syrian cauldron, however, Hezbollah’s direct involvement in the war is still relatively limited and its influence on overall events in Syria is secondary. The analysts at the Meir Amit Center say, though, that in their assessment, Hezbollah’s involvement may grow as the Syrian regime weakens and the dangers to Iran and Hezbollah’s strategic interests increase.

— Read more in Hezbollah Involvement in the Syrian Civil War (Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Tel Aviv, 5 June 2013)