Iraq and its extremist problem: what now for the troubled state?

Deir El-Zour provinces merged into a single operational unit.

In waging war against Baghdad and Damascus, the extremists have benefited from support from neighbors. The Gulf Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have stepped in to exploit the power vacuum left by the United States and are pursuing their rivalry with Iran by providing money, arms and fighters to the insurgencies. This is a short-sighted policy that, like their support for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, may rebound against them.

While the policies of the Saudis are particularly pernicious, Iran’s role also adds to the level of violence. Iran has an interest in regional stability. It needs a stable western border, especially if — as widely expected — order in Afghanistan breaks down with the departure of U.S. troops later this year.

Although he is probably not their preferred candidate, Tehran sees Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki as the means for promoting that stability in Iraq. However, taken with its support for the Assad regimein Syria, Iran’s role in Iraq serves as a provocation of extremists fed on a diet of hostility to Shi’a Islam.

Internal instability
Another important factor has been al-Maliki himself. A Shi’a Muslim, he suffered along with many other Shi’a at the hands of Saddam Hussein’s government and its Sunni supporters. Since coming to power in 2006, al-Maliki has struggled to put aside his hostility towards Iraq’s Sunnis to pursue inclusive national policies.

Instead, immediately after the U.S. withdrawal, he initiated a programof driving Sunnis from positions of power.

Al-Maliki’s policies are also driven by elections that are due in April. Local elections in 2013showed a marked deterioration in his standing among Iraq’s Shi’a, and he needs to regain their support. He sees a tough line against Sunni dissent as a way of achieving this end.

The Sunni-dominated Anbar province has responded badlyto al-Maliki’s perceived hostility. While few people anywhere in the region would chose to live under the sharia principles of the extremists, there is a well of anger towards Baghdad in the province that the various groups have been able to dip into, resulting in a level of tolerance among the Sunni population of the activities of the insurgents.

This has also extended to the province’s powerful tribes, which appear to be hedging their bets on the outcome of the confrontation between Baghdad and the extremists.

Where to now?
A solution to the problem of Iraq’s insurgency will not be found quickly. It cannot be developed by the Iraqis alone and cannot be separated from the civil war in Syria. It must involve a major political effort involving all the parties affected by the conflict. Arms alone will not achieve anything lasting.

Possibly the greatest hope for Iraq and the wider region lies in a serious rapprochement between the United States and Iran. Such a development would revolutionize the politics of the region, putting the authoritarian regimes on notice and forcing the Saudis and other Gulf states to end their anti-Iran campaign and to work towards political solutions in Iraq and Syria.

We may already be seeing signs of such a future with Oman facilitatingU.S.-Iran contacts and rejecting Saudi plans for an anti-Iran military alliance in the Gulf. Other small Gulf countries are also beginning to review their options, but will it stop the bloodshed in Iraq?

Anthony Billingsley is Lecturer, School of Social Sciences and International Studies at University of New South Wales.This storyis published courtesy of The Conversation(under Creative Commons-Attribution/No derivatives).