BioterrorismCDC says anthrax infection “highly unlikely,” but reassigns bioterror lab chief
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC) has advised some of its employees to stop taking antibiotics meant to fight a possible anthrax infection after preliminary tests suggest that it is “highly unlikely” those employees were exposed to live anthrax following an incident in June. Michael Farrell, head of the CDC bioterror lab, has been reassigned.
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has advised some of its employees to stop taking antibiotics meant to fight a possible anthrax infection after preliminary tests suggest that it is “highly unlikely” those employees were exposed to live anthrax following an incident in June.
Fecima reports that between 6 June and 13 June, workers in the agency’s Bioterror Rapid Response and Advanced Technology Laboratory were exploring a new method for killing anthrax before they sent samples of what they believed to be inactive bacteria for use in two lower-security CDC labs. Mishandling of the anthrax containers by the recipients led to a scare of airborne anthrax. After the incident, the CDC identified two groups of employees who were potentially exposed to aerosols in the affected lab space, and some who were not potentially exposed but worked in or near the affected lab space.
“Employees in these groups are having one-on-one appointments with medical staff in CDC’s occupational health clinic who are reviewing all information with them and discussing the pros and cons of continuing post-exposure prophylaxis as part of shared decision making,” CDC spokesman Tom Skinner said.
About twenty-nine of roughly eighty-four employees thought to have been exposed have been advised to continue taking antibiotics, while the rest have been advised to stop taking them.
Michael Farrell, head of the bioterror lab, has been reassigned while Dr. Harold Jaffe, the CDC’s associate director for science, investigates how proper protocols were violated. CDC spokesman Benjamin Haynes reported later in June that protocol calls for inactive anthrax to be slided and observed after forty-eight hours to see whether spores develop, but the sample in the incident was checked and sent to lower-level labs after twenty-four hours.
In an e-mail to staff, CDC director Dr. Thomas Frieden acknowledged that the agency had failed to inform the wider CDC community about the anthrax incident. “We waited too long to inform the broader CDC workforce,” he wrote.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture is conducting its own investigation.
