ISISWhy Western boots should stay out of Iraq and Syria
The main reason why we should ignore the growing calls in the United States, Canada and Australia for Western “boots on ground” — meaning ground troops — to fight and destroy the Islamic State (IS) is this: In Iraq and Syria right now there is no alternative group that could fill the void created by a defeated IS. So even if we could topple IS, who would govern the liberated lands? One of the key lessons we learnt from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars is that military forays cannot succeed without a political solution. Attempting to create such a political solution only after the fact is not something that the world has proven adept at. In the case of IS, there is currently no clear and viable political endgame. So as hard as it might be to accept for some, if defeating IS is the goal, the best solution is likely to be isolate the militants and work to weaken them from within in Iraq – this is what the United States did so successfully in 2006 with the same Sunni groups — while adopting a realpolitik approach to the return of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Denis Dragovic, University of Melbourne // Source: theconversation.com
There are two reasons why we should ignore the growing calls in the United States, Canada and Australia for Western “boots on ground” — meaning ground troops — to fight and destroy the Islamic State (IS).
The most often heard caution against engaging in urban warfare is the potential for civilian deaths, and the inevitable protracted engagement that creates resentment, which in turn feeds the propaganda machine. But this article responds mainly to the second reason, which is of far greater consequence: the fact that in Iraq and Syria right now, there is no alternative group that could fill the void created by a defeated IS. So even if we could topple IS, who would govern the liberated lands?
Behind the rise of IS
The success of IS in Iraq and Syria has been dependent upon different factors.
In Iraq, the areas controlled by IS are largely Sunni Arab territories. Having benefited from Saddam Hussein’s rule, the shift to democracy and an eight-year Shia government of Nouri al-Maliki has turned the tables.
The Sunni community of Iraq has been disenfranchised and in some cases persecuted by the dominant Shia through official and unofficial channels.
IS’s success was only made possible by the support of this Sunni community. Any lasting solution will require Baghdad wresting that allegiance away from the black flag of IS and back to the banner of a united Iraq.
This is why Obama held out against supporting Nouri al-Maliki’s efforts to retain power, recognizing the need for systematic political change.
But the new government has only shifted personalities at the highest of levels. The vast bureaucratic and military infrastructure was and remains a Shia dominated body, with positions filled through cronyism, nepotism and corruption.
It is unlikely that the change of government under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi will mean the interests of Iraq’s Sunni population are being served any better in the near future. A root and branch review of the Iraqi public sector is required which will require a concerted political effort over many years.
Under these circumstances, arming and supporting the Shia-dominated Iraqi military to “liberate” Sunni territories is likely to cause further angst.
