TerrorismWhat makes a terrorist stop being a terrorist?
The journey into and out of terrorism is as personal as it is complex. De-radicalization programs still represent some of the most creative approaches to counter-terrorism. They can be powerful forces in thinning the ranks of lower-level members. But if we do not have a sincere discussion of why or how they work, their future will be in jeopardy. With rumors of hundreds of disillusioned ex-ISIS members exploring a potential return home, we are already way behind. We need clear thinking to underpin these programs and their evaluation. In the absence of transparency and clearer expectations, it will only take one-high profile failure (would any program survive if one of its graduates detonated a suicide bomb closer to home?) for the potential of these programs to be lost forever.
John Horgan, University of Massachusetts - Lowell // Source: uml.edu
“Feet first.” That’s how one terrorist leader told recruits was the only way out. It makes sense. Allowing members to just walk away wouldn’t be good for the group’s image.
And yet — at the same time as Islamic State parades its European jihadists in shocking beheading videos and continues to recruit aggressively around the world — terrorists do disengage all the time. Some quietly disappear. Others go public, telling their stories on TV or in autobiographies. They embrace their new identity as an “ex-“ or “former” to warn others of the dangers of involvement.
We have also come to know formers through the rise of so-called de-radicalization programs. For the past decade, I’ve examined how and why terrorists walk away, and I’ve also closely examined programs aimed at helping ease that transition.
De-radicalization: how it works
One of the newest efforts was launched earlier this year by social workers and psychologists in Denmark. Their objective? To successfully reintegrate Danish jihadists who left a few short years ago to take up arms against the Syrian regime. Now they want to come home.
The Danes join similar ongoing efforts around the world. It’s hard to say how many de-radicalization programs exist. At least fifteen are publicly known, from Saudi Arabia to Singapore, but there are likely twice as many. Some are the brainchildren of individuals trying to make a difference in managing a group of terrorist prisoners. Others are wide-ranging, well-funded (typically by governments) initiatives that offer invited tours to journalists and academics. You can even meet and chat with “model” participants. In one of my first visits to a de-radicalization facility, back in March 2008, I was invited to sit and have dinner with several al Qaeda members undergoing rehabilitation, whom, I was assured, were there voluntarily.
On the surface, such efforts are promising. After all, who wouldn’t support an approach to counter-terrorism that isn’t just cost-effective (it’s far cheaper than indefinite detention) but doesn’t rely on torture or just throwing away the key forever? Some programs openly claim tremendous success. The decade-old program in Saudi Arabia, for example, boasts a guaranteed low rate of recidivism — about 10-20 percent.
