U.S. plan to train “moderate” Syrian rebels raises troubling questions

Who are they meant to fight?
Should the moderate rebels fight the jihadists, the Syrian military, Iranian Quds force, Hezbollah, or anyone they come up against?

Three of the countries that have allegedly agreed to host the training — Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia — have long called for the downfall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and have been accused of explicitly or implicitly supporting various jihadist groups during the conflict. They have their own agendas, which do not necessarily match US aims.

There are reports that the moderate rebels to be trained in Turkey will be chosen by the Turkish intelligence service, which will undoubtedly do so with a view to advancing its own aims.

Who will be the targeting authority for the rebels’ operations inside Syria, and how will it be monitored in the absence of U.S. forces? What if the rebels focus on Syrian military forces? What would be the attitude of Iran to this?

What will be the attitude of other (non-radical Islamist) groups to the introduction of U.S.-trained rebels if these rebels are fighting against fellow Muslims in preference to Assad’s forces? What if, by targeting Islamic State (IS) on the ground, their actions simply tilt the balance in favor of another Islamist group such as Jabhat al-Nusra?

How will the U.S. safely arm the rebels?
Without having troops on the ground accompanying the “moderate” rebels, the United States has effectively lost control over the weapons it supplies.

While the ideal situation is that these groups successfully use the weapons against IS or Jabhat al-Nusra or the Syrian army and its allies, battlefields are chaotic places and Middle Eastern society is a complex web of often-changing alliances. The U.S.-trained militia could be defeated on the battlefield and their weapons lost, as has reportedly happened previously.

Elements of these moderate rebel forces could be co-opted willingly or unwillingly to fight in support of jihadist groups against Syrian government forces or other jihadist groups. Weapons could be sold but reported as lost or they could be used in atrocities against civilians, or any number of other unsavory permutations or combinations.

These queries are but some of many that demand an answer, without having even touched on the issue of the legality of openly equipping, training, and deploying an armed group across national borders. How will they deploy them across state borders? What will the coalition do if Assad decides to target these rebel groups?

The Syrian government may well allow them to engage with and degrade IS and then target them after they’ve done Assad’s dirty work. Would the coalition of anti-Assad forces be expected to provide close air support to this group?

There are no easy solutions to an issue as complex as Syria. The uncoordinated, short-term actions of some of the regional states have simply exacerbated what was already a hideously difficult operating environment.

If there hasn’t been a military solution to the problem that has worked in the nearly four years of the conflict, then the introduction of another 15,000 armed rebels over several years, with an indistinct aim, is unlikely to do much more than further muddy the treacherous waters.

Rodger Shanahan is Associate Professor, National Security College at Australian National University. This story is published courtesy of The Conversation (under Creative Commons-Attribution/No derivatives).