African securityU.S. says its counterterrorism strategy in Somalia is working, but critics disagree

Published 7 April 2015

President Barack Obama has referred to his strategy against al-Shabaab militants in Somalia as a model of success for his administration’s low-investment, light-footprint approach to counterterrorism. Under his administration’s policies, U.S. drones have killed several of the group’s leaders, and African Union (AU) troops, backed by the U.S. military, have forced al-Shabaab fighters to flee large swaths of territory. Critics of this approach now say that last week’s massacre of 148 people at Garissa University College in Kenya by al-Shabaab militants, demonstrates the limits of Obama’s approach to counterterrorism.

President Barack Obama has referred to his strategy against al-Shabaab militants in Somalia as a model of success for his administration’s low-investment, light-footprint approach to counterterrorism. Under his administration’s policies, U.S. drones have killed several of the group’s leaders, and African Union (AU) troops, backed by the U.S. military, have forced al-Shabaab fighters to flee large swaths of territory.

Critics of this approach now say that last week’s massacre of 148 people at Garissa University College in Kenya by al-Shabaab militants, demonstrates the limits of Obama’s approach to counterterrorism.

The Washington Post reports that administration officials say the recent attack in Kenya was a sign of a desperate al-Shabaab. “As much as we hate to think about it, this is what desperate groups do. They try to have smaller teams go out and (conduct) higher-impact operations,” said a White House official. The administration points out that al-Shabaab, which once controlled southern Somalia, has lost more than 75 percent of its territory in recent years. It has lost control of Kismayo, where it controlled the lucrative port. The group’s finances have been drained.

Still, some critics say Somali and African Union forces, backed by the White House and have received about $1 billion in training, equipment, and assistance since 2007, have failed to plan for defeating al-Shabaab. “There’s no question that there was not an effective plan to win the peace after winning the war,” said Kenneth Menkhaus, a professor at Davidson College. “Now, who’s to blame for that is another matter.” According to Menkhaus, after government troops chased away al-Shabaab from an area the group controlled, ill-disciplined militia forces filled the vacuum. “They made things worse,” Menkhaus said. “The area became less secure after al-Shabaab left. The reality is that there is only so much you can do if the (Somali) government is pocketing all the money and not following through.”

J. Peter Pham, director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, said the international community’s insufficient response had allowed al-Shabaab to survive in and out of Somalia. “Al-Shabaab is not defeated, it has just changed,” functioning today as a regional terrorist group, Pham said. “Arguably, their terror attacks have gone up as they lost territory.”

For the White House, Somalia simply needs time, and foreign intervention can only go so far. There are roughly 22,000 African Union troops in Somalia, which has a coastline about as long as the U.S. Eastern Seaboard. “This is still a relatively new project,” said a senior administration official. “People look at a map and they don’t realize the tyranny of distance and size there…These rebuilding efforts take time.”