Nuclear weaponsTo prevent Iranian nukes, a negotiated deal better than a military strike: David Albright

Published 24 April 2015

David Albright is the founder and president of the Washington, D.C.-based non-profit Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), and author of several books on fissile materials and nuclear weapons proliferation. In a testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday, and an interview with Deutsche Welle on Thursday, Albrights says that there is every reason to be suspicious of Iran because it has cheated on its obligations in the past and has been uncooperative on an ongoing basis. Iran has also built many sites in secret, so any agreement with Iran should have extra insurance — a more powerful inspection and verification tool to try to ferret out any secret nuclear activities or facilities that Iran would build. Still, a negotiated deal, if it includes sufficiently robust inspection and verification measures, would be a more effective way than a military strike to make sure Iran does not develop nuclear weapons.

David Albright is the founder and president of the Washington, D.C.-based non-profit Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), and author of several books on fissile materials and nuclear weapons proliferation. His book Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (Free Press, 2010) was listed by The Atlantic as one of the best foreign affairs books of 2010. 

Albright worked with the IAEA Action Team from 1992 until 1997, focusing on analyses of Iraqi documents and past procurement activities. In June 1996 he was the first non-governmental inspector of the Iraqi nuclear program. On this inspection mission, Albright questioned members of Iraq’s former uranium enrichment programs about their statements in Iraq’s draft “Full, Final, and Complete Declaration.” In the spring of 2003, after the fall of Baghdad, he initiated a successful effort to retrieve the only complete set of classified Iraqi documents, hidden since the 1991 Gulf War, about making gas centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.

On Wednesday, 22 April, Albright testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on “Adequate Verification Under a Comprehensive Iran Nuclear Deal.”

Deutsche Welle (DW) interviewed Albright on Iran’s nuclear program and the effort by the P5+1 group to reach an agreement with Iran which would block Iran’s path to the bomb. The interview was published yesterday (Thursday, 23 April).

Albrights says that there is every reason to be suspicious of Iran because it has cheated on its obligations in the past and has been uncooperative on an ongoing basis. Iran has also built many sites in secret, so any agreement with Iran should have extra insurance — a more powerful inspection and verification tool to try to ferret out any secret nuclear activities or facilities that Iran would build. Still, a negotiated deal, if it includes sufficiently robust inspection and verification measures, would be a more effective way than a military strike to make sure Iran does not develop nuclear weapons.

He notes that even if a military strike is deemed necessary, it would not be a single strike – a one-off effort — like Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor. Rather, the initial strike would have to be followed by a campaign to keep Iran from rebuilding the day after – and this means sustained attacks, over time, with planes going in and missiles launched to destroy nuclear program-related targets as Iran rebuilds them.