IranU.S. assumptions about key elements of Iran deal unrealistically “rosy”: Critics
Critics of the emerging nuclear deal with Iran say that there ae two major risks which are not adequately addressed in the discussions over the agreement. The first is that Iranians will cheat, and continue to move toward the bomb covertly. The second, more subtle, problem is the combination of the State Department’s habit of tardy reporting, and the nuclear infrastructure and materials Iran will be allowed to keep, which will make its “breakout” time — that is, the time it will need to build a bomb from the point of making a decision to do so — exceedingly short.
Critics of the emerging nuclear deal with Iran say that there ae two major risks which are not adequately addressed in the discussions over the agreement.
The first is that Iranians will cheat, and continue to move toward the bomb covertly. Gen. Michael Flynn, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), told Congress that “it is prudent to conclude that there are elements of Iran’s nuclear program that still remain hidden from view.”
The second, more subtle, problem is the combination of the State Department’s habit of tardy reporting, and the nuclear infrastructure and materials Iran will be allowed to keep, which will make its “breakout” time — that is, the time it will need to build a bomb from the point of making a decision to do so — exceedingly short.
This second problem is highlighted in two articles published yesterday (“See No Iran Evil at State,” Wall Street Journal, 22 June 2015; and Alan J. Kuperman, “The Iran Deal’s Fatal Flaw,” New York Times, 22 June 2015).
The Journal writes that a report last month by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that State had failed to submit timely reports to Congress on the nuclear proliferation activities of Iran, North Korea, and Syria – and that instead of delivering reports every six months, as Congress had mandated in the 2006 Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA), delays ranged from twenty-two months to three years.
GAO found that “Prolonged delays in eventually imposing INKSNA sanctions could erode the credibility of such threats and INKSNA’s utility as a tool in helping to curb weapons of mass destruction proliferation.” The agency also concluded that State knew in 2011 of twenty-three people involved in activities which violated the sanctions imposed on the three countries, but only imposed sanctions on these individuals last December.
GAO offers details of a complex bureaucratic process, involving four “State-led interagency working groups,” input from the intelligence community, further input from the Departments of Defense, Energy, Commerce and the National Security Council, a meeting of a “sub-Interagency Policy Committee,” further review by relevant committees and eventual sign-off from the Deputy Secretary of State.
GAO further notes that “State officials told us that a variety of political concerns, such as international negotiations and relations with countries involved in transfers, can delay State’s INKSNA process.”
