SyriaConcerns grow about Syria’s nuclear materials
In September 2007 Israel destroyed the Al Kibar nuclear reactor in north-east Syria, which the Assad regime was building with the aid of North Korea. It is now under the control of ISIS, which is apparently dismantling and possibly conducting excavation activities at the site. Although Syria is no longer believed to have an active, secret nuclear reactor program at this time, it is believed to be hiding assets associated with its past undeclared nuclear efforts, including a large stock of more than 50,000 kilograms of natural uranium. Natural uranium is not as readily usable as Syria’s past chemical weapons stockpile, but if enriched to weapon-grade, this amount of natural uranium would be enough for at least 3- 5 nuclear weapons. As the situation in Syria deteriorates, concerns about Syria’ nuclear assets grow.
The destroyed Al Kibar reactor site in Syria – it was destroyed by Israel in September 2007 — is now under the control of ISIS, which is apparently dismantling and possibly conducting excavation activities at the site. ISIS’s intentions are unknown. There is no new information about Syria’s supply of uranium which would have been used in the destroyed reactor, although it is not believed to be at the reactor site or in the hands of ISIS. New information adds support that Syria intended to build a plant to separate plutonium from the reactor’s irradiated fuel.
Researchers at the Washington, D.C-based Institute for Science and International Security write that although Syria is no longer believed to have an active, secret nuclear reactor program at this time, it is believed to be hiding assets associated with its past undeclared nuclear efforts. These unresolved nuclear concerns, coupled with the deteriorating security situation in Syria caused by the on-going civil war and advances by ISIS, is a continued source of concern about the security of any nuclear materials, including an alleged large stock of natural uranium, nuclear-related equipment, and nuclear scientists and engineers still present in the country.
The researchers write that the natural uranium, believed to exceed 50,000 kilograms, is not as readily usable as Syria’s past chemical weapons stockpile, because it requires further enriching to be usable in a nuclear weapon. This amount of natural uranium would be enough, if enriched to weapon-grade, for at least 3- 5 nuclear weapons.
Background
In September 2007 Israel destroyed the Al Kibar nuclear reactor in north-east Syria, which the Assad regime was building with the aid of North Korea. Nuclear experts say that although Syria is no longer believed to have an active, secret nuclear program, it is believed to be hiding and retaining assets associated with this past undeclared nuclear reactor effort. David Albright and colleagues at the Institute for Science and International Security write that such a reactor is accompanied by a range of nuclear and other materials, such as natural uranium, specialized equipment, expertise, and know-how. Where, then, are the remains of this program? Where is the natural uranium fuel for the reactor? What has become of the scientists and engineers assigned to the program? Was Syria planning to separate the plutonium? If so, did it have designs for a plutonium separation plant and some of the necessary equipment? Who controls the remains? What can the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) do, other than providing its past assessment that the bombed site was likely a gas-graphite reactor large enough to support a small nuclear weapons program?
The remnants of Syria’s undeclared nuclear program pose a proliferation risk. Albright et al. note that any known or suspected nuclear materials inside Syria are not as readily usable as a chemical weapons stockpile. For example, natural uranium is not readily usable in a nuclear weapon unless it is further enriched to highly enriched uranium (HEU) or put in a reactor to make plutonium and subsequently separated from the irradiated fuel. Natural uranium is a weak radioactive source and thus a poor choice for a dirty bomb. Nonetheless, the allegedly large stock of natural uranium, other nuclear-related materials, equipment, and other resources associated with the past nuclear program would be attractive to terrorists, certain states, and commodity traffickers. They may wish to sell these goods on the black market or otherwise seek to use them to extract concessions or cause damage. This material may also end up in undeclared nuclear programs of other states.
Albright and his colleagues have written a report to update the situation with new, albeit limited, information. It is a follow-on to earlier reports by the Institute for Science and International Security. The authors recommend that Syria’s nuclear assets, particularly those that were part of its undeclared nuclear efforts, need to be located and placed under international monitoring or removed from the country.
The authors of the report conclude that regardless of the purpose of Syria’s nuclear reactor program at Al Kibar, the deteriorating situation in Syria raises serious concerns about the security of nuclear material, equipment, and scientists. It is extremely important that Syria’s nuclear assets are located and placed under international monitoring or removed from the country.
— Read more in David Albright et al., “Syria’s Unresolved Nuclear Issues Reemerge in Wake of ISIL Advance and Ongoing Civil War” (Institute for Science and International Security, 30 June 2015); and David Albright et al., “Syria’s Past, Secret Nuclear Program Poses Proliferation Risks” (Institute for Science and International Security, 12 September 2013)
