Iran dealInspection regime in Iran informed by lessons from Iraq experience

Published 28 July 2015

Many critics of the agreement reached between the P5+1 and Iran over Iran’s nuclear program are especially concerned with the inspection regime negotiated in Geneva. The initial goal of the world powers was, in President Barack Obama’s words, an “Anywhere, anytime” inspections, but the deal finally reached saw the two sides agree to inspection procedures which fall short of that goal.

Many critics of the agreement reached between the P5+1 and Iran over Iran’s nuclear program are especially concerned with the inspection regime negotiated in Geneva. The initial goal of the world powers was, in President Barack Obama’s words, an “Anywhere, anytime” inspections, but the deal finally reached saw the two sides agree to inspection procedures which fall short of that goal.

Analysts note that to be successful, the inspection system developed to monitor Iran’s compliance with the deal should be informed by the lessons of the inspections in Iraq following the first Gulf War.

“The whole Iraq experience and all of the negative consequences make one quite sober about the prospect of trying to make sure we get it right with Iran,” Greg Thielmann, a former State Department specialist on nuclear proliferation, told Bloomberg.

Experts say that there are at least three lessons from the Ira inspection experience which the powers dealing with Iran should recognize and implement:

  •  Iran should be made aware now, in no uncertain terms, that the cost for non-compliance, foot-dragging, and violations will be steep
  •  The inspectors and the countries behind them must demonstrate a level of persistence – and demonstrate it over time – to a degree not usually found in similar arrangements
  •  The inspectors must be creative, innovative, and unpredictable: In Iraq, the Iraqi regime, after a couple of years, learned what the inspectors were looking for and what methods they used – and adjusted its illicit conduct accordingly

In Iraq, the inspectors who were looking into suspected nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons sites were harassed, blocked, given the run-around – and, in one case in which they found incriminating documents about Iraq’s WMD program, were held hostage for five days in a parking lot by Iraq’s security services.

In October 1998 Saddam Hussein kicked the inspectors out, and two months later U.S. and coalition forces bombed nearly 200 suspected sites in Iraq.

Expert who support the agreement note that inspection, detection, and monitoring technology has advanced since the Iraq inspection days, and that at least some aspects of the inspection regime will not depend on Iranian cooperation. The remote sensors, environmental monitoring, and more sophisticated spy satellites employed by the inspectors will be able to pick up at least some of the activities Iran may try to hide.

Under the agreement, Iran has agreed to have between 130 and 150 inspectors from countries which have diplomatic relations with Iran move about Iran looking for evidence of illicit activity. Iran has also agreed for the IAEA to monitor uranium enrichment levels by using an online system, and place electronic seals on some related equipment.

Robert Gallucci, who was the No. 2 official on the UN Special Commission that investigated Iraq, says that timely access to any site in Iran, including military installations, is essential. “Any place they don’t want you to go, you want to go, and any place they welcome you, you don’t care about going,” he told Bloomberg.