Iran dealThe Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action “kicks the can down the road”: How to prepare for the day when the can finally lands

Published 28 July 2015

The Institute for Science and International Security has published a series of briefs analyzing different aspects of the agreement reached between the P5+1 and Iran over the latter’s nuclear program. One brief deals with what the United States and the other world powers need to do now to prepare for what may happen in Iran in ten to fifteen years when many of the limits the agreement imposes on Iran’s nuclear activities will expire. The agreement does not prohibit Iran from building a large uranium enrichment capability and even a reprocessing, or a plutonium separation, capability. The agreement essentially delays the day when Iran reestablishes a nuclear weapons capability and possibly builds nuclear weapons, that is, the agreement essentially “kicks the can down the road.” Prudent planning requires careful efforts now to prepare for the day when the can lands.

The Institute for Science and InternationalSecurity has published a series of briefs analyzing different aspects of the agreement reached between the P5+1 and Iran over the latter’s nuclear program. The following brief, issued on 22 July 2015, deals with what the United States and the other world powers need to do now to prepare for what may happen in Iran in ten to fifteen years, when many of the limits the agreement imposes on Iran’s nuclear activities will expire.

The brief:

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) may only delay the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program.In that case, a political predicate is needed for not accepting or approving of an unnecessary,uneconomicsemi-commercial Iranian enrichment program or any reprocessing program after the major limitationsofthe JCPOAexpire.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s fundamental goal is to ensure that Iran’s nuclear programis peaceful even after its major nuclear limitations end. Put in alternative formulations, it seeks toensure that Iran will not build nuclear weapons, or more directly, that Iran will be prevented from buildingthem during the life of the agreement, which is not a time bound commitment in general terms. Whetherit meets this goal is unclear, and even perhaps doubtful in the long term. This uncertainty poses oneof the more fundamental challenges to the agreement. To reduce this potential negative aspect ofthe deal, the United States should view the deal as by no means approving of Iran’s plans for alarge uranium enrichment program or its possible plans to create a reprocessing program. It should do soon the basis that they are uneconomic and unnecessary and pose a threat to regional andinternational security.

The JCPOA’s preface conditions Iran’s nuclear program and its growth on “scientificand economic considerations” and assurances that the programs are for “exclusively peacefulpurposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.” These conditions are unlikely to be met10-15 years from now. Making this political predicate clear for not accepting or approving of anyplutonium reprocessing or large growth in uranium enrichment will lay the basis for the United States to be ableto deal with issues that emerge after most of the deal’s restrictionsend.

For ten years, this agreement creates the conditions that any serious effort by Iran to buildnuclear weapons will be highly time consuming and will be vulnerable to detection, allowing time for aharshresponse. The JCPOA will likely do as it claims and this is the most notable strength of theagreement.